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∎ Syria’s civil war has long since been decided in favour of the regime. 
There is no prospect of a negotiated settlement, reconciliation or lasting 
stabilisation. 
∎ Syria faces enormous challenges, well beyond the rebuilding of infra-
structure and housing. It will also need assistance to restart its economy, 
stabilise its currency and renew its public services, in particular educa-
tion, health, electricity and water. 
∎ The funds required for comprehensive reconstruction are extremely un-
likely to become available, given the attitude of the Syrian leadership, the 
economic ramifications of the Covid-19 pandemic, and the geopolitical 
interests of regional and global powers. Nor are resources likely to be 
deployed in line with the needs of the population. 
∎ The EU and its member states have made engagement in Syria’s recon-
struction conditional on viable steps towards a negotiated conflict settle-
ment and a political opening. They should adapt their approach to align 
better with the current realities and challenges on the ground. 
∎ That means in particular targeting humanitarian aid more effectively, 
dismantling certain sectoral sanctions and supporting the rehabilitation 
of basic infrastructure – even in areas controlled by the Syrian govern-
ment. This would represent a more effective contribution to improving 
living conditions and avoiding further erosion of public services. 
∎ Lasting stabilisation will require fundamental reforms. In this vein, Brus-
sels should spell out its “more for more” approach. 
∎ Europe should refrain from normalising relations with the top leaders 
of the Assad regime and instead step up its support for prosecution of 
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Issues and Recommendations 
Reconstruction in Syria 
Challenges and Policy Options for the 
EU and its Member States 
Even if the fighting is not over, the Syrian regime has 
won the civil war in military terms. Damascus and 
its allies controlled about two-thirds of the country 
by spring 2020, and the Assad regime appeared set 
to recapture the remaining areas. There is currently 
no prospect of a negotiated settlement, reconciliation 
between conflict parties and population groups, or 
lasting peace and stabilisation. 
The armed conflict in Syria, which began in 2011 
following the violent suppression of a protest move-
ment, has had disastrous consequences for the coun-
try’s population, infrastructure and economy. It 
is estimated that reconstruction will cost US$250 
to US$400 billion or even US$1 trillion, depending 
on the source. The enormous challenges extend far 
beyond mine clearance and physical rebuilding of 
infrastructure and housing: a huge loss of (skilled) 
labour, contraction of the economy, currency devalua-
tion and the collapse of public services head the list. 
Reconstruction has already begun. But this is not 
a comprehensive nation-wide programme, centrally 
planned and managed with international funding. 
Rather, diverse actors implement projects, mainly at 
the local level. Few of them pay much heed to the 
needs of the population. The prime concern for the 
leadership in Damascus is to consolidate its grip on 
power. Reconstruction efforts are directed towards 
cementing demographic changes, rewarding the 
loyalty of old and new elites through lucrative invest-
ment opportunities, and compensating the regime’s 
international supporters – first and foremost Russia 
and Iran – with access to Syria’s resources. At the 
same time the legal and political framework for hu-
manitarian aid that Damascus has created ensures – 
in the areas it controls – that the regime has the last 
word on decisions about where international aid is 
deployed, by whom, and to whose benefit. 
The Syrian leadership is adamant that it will 
accept foreign engagement in reconstruction only 
from friendly countries and without conditionality. 
But Damascus’s allies are neither willing nor able 
to fund comprehensive nation-wide reconstruction. 
Other potential funders categorically reject engage-
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ment (the United States), hesitate (the Arab Gulf 
states), position themselves for later engagement 
(China) or concentrate exclusively on particular 
regions, even integrating them (at least partly) into 
its own economy and administration (Turkey). Given 
the attitude of the Syrian leadership and the irrec-
oncilable geopolitical interests and visions for Syria’s 
future political and societal order of the regional and 
global powers it is extremely unlikely that Syria will 
receive sufficient funding for reconstruction. The 
economic repercussions of the Covid-19 pandemic, 
especially the collapse of the oil price, are likely to 
further constrain available funding. 
Europe – in the sense of the EU and its member 
states plus the UK – has made its engagement con-
ditional on viable steps towards a negotiated conflict 
settlement and a political opening. Its involvement 
has therefore been largely restricted to humanitarian 
aid. At the same time the EU has imposed compre-
hensive sanctions. But the European approach has 
had little influence on the conflict dynamics on the 
ground or the behaviour of the Assad regime. This is, 
amongst other factors, because the sanctions regime 
and the conditionality of reconstruction assistance 
are configured for a regime change agenda that is no 
longer a realistic prospect (even if the EU has softened 
its rhetoric, no longer talking explicitly about regime 
change or power-sharing, but an inclusive political 
transition). At the same time, Brussels has still not 
spelled out what kind of change in Damascus – 
below the threshold of political transition – would 
lead to which European concessions. Another prob-
lematic aspect of the European approach is that the 
combination of its sanctions and the restrictions 
that apply to humanitarian aid hinder the provision 
of effective assistance to the population. In view of 
the deepening economic crisis, such aid is urgently 
needed. As it stands, the EU risks contributing to 
cementing a situation in which the Syrian population 
remains permanently dependent on international aid 
and on the regime’s benevolence. 
In light of these observations the present research 
paper examines the question of how the EU and its 
member states can adjust their approach to Syria in 
such a way as to better align it with the current real-
ities and challenges on the ground, bring Europe’s 
instruments into line with its interests, and make 
best possible use of the narrow available leeway. That 
would presuppose, first of all, admitting that Euro-
pean incentives and sanctions will not bring about a 
negotiated conflict settlement or a political opening. 
That road has been closed by the military successes 
of the Assad regime and its allies. It means, secondly, 
rejecting the illusion that Damascus could become 
a reliable partner for economic recovery and recon-
struction, for counter-terrorism and for return of 
refugees. It encompasses, thirdly, not confusing the 
current economic and currency crisis and the erosion 
of state capacities in Syria with an imminent collapse 
of the regime – still less in favour of an alternative 
political force that would unify and stabilise the 
country. 
Europe should contribute more effectively than 
hitherto to alleviating suffering, promoting improve-
ments in living conditions and stopping the rapid 
erosion of public services. In this vein, it should work 
to enhance the effectiveness of UN aid, dismantle 
those sectoral sanctions that stand in the way of 
recovery and under certain conditions even support 
rehabilitation of basic infrastructure in areas con-
trolled by the regime. But lasting stabilisation will 
require fundamental reforms. To that end the EU 
should flesh out its “more for more” approach to lay 
out a concrete path for largely normalising relations 
with Damascus in return for political opening and 
structural reforms. Europe should, however, refrain 
from normalising relations with the top leaders of 
the Assad regime and instead step up its support for 
prosecution of war crimes, grave human rights viola-
tions and the use of internationally banned weapons. 
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In military terms, the civil war in Syria has long since 
been decided in favour of the regime. Damascus and 
its allies now control about two-thirds of the country1 
and Damascus seeks to reconquer the remaining areas. 
There is no prospect of a negotiated conflict settle-
ment, reconciliation between conflict parties and 
population groups, or lasting peace and stabilisation. 
This is because – alongside a multitude of domestic 
and foreign militias – five regional and global 
powers (Iran, Israel, Russia, Turkey, United States) 
with irreconcilable geopolitical interests and visions 
for Syria’s future political and societal order have a 
military presence in the country.2 Also, remnants of 
the “Islamic State” (IS) and other radical rebel groups 
are expected to form the core of a new insurgency 
and terrorist network. They are likely to hamper 
stabilisation efforts and have broader destabilising 
effects.3 And there should be no expectation of the 
Constitutional Committee, which began its work 
 
1 See map on page 33. 
2 There are also French special forces operating with the 
anti-IS coalition. See International Institute for Strategic 
Studies (IISS), “Chapter Seven: Middle East and North Africa”, 
The Military Balance 120, no. 1 (2020): 324–87 (376ff.). 
3 See Dareen Khalifa and Elizabeth Tsurkov, “Has Turkey’s 
Incursion into Syria Opened the Door for an Islamic State 
Comeback?” War on the Rocks, Commentary, 21 February 
2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/02/has-turkeys-
incursion-into-syria-opened-the-door-for-an-islamic-state-
comeback/ (accessed 26 February 2020); Jeff Seldin, “Islamic 
State Poised for Comeback, US Defense Officials Report”, 
Voice of America, 4 February 2020, https://www.voanews.com/ 
middle-east/islamic-state-poised-comeback-us-defense-
officials-report (accessed 26 February 2020). 
under UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen at the end of 
October 2019,4 agreeing on meaningful constitutional 
reforms or a negotiated conflict settlement (assuming 
the talks continue at all). Not only are important 
groups entirely absent,5 but Damascus has also made 
it abundantly clear that it has no interest in power-
sharing or a political transition – and therefore dis-
tanced itself from “its own” delegation. 
Nevertheless, Syria’s reconstruction is already 
well under way. Yet, it does not follow the standard 
approach of the international financial institutions 
(IFIs), which would revolve around a comprehensive 
nation-wide programme with central planning and 
management and international funding. Instead 
diverse actors implement a variety of projects, mainly 
at the local level. As a rule, they do not pay heed 
to the needs of the population. Instead, in the vast 
majority of cases, they serve to further specific inter-
 
4 For the background see Muriel Asseburg, “Syria: UN 
Mediation at the Mercy of Regional and Major-Power Inter-
ests”, in Muriel Asseburg, Wolfram Lacher and Mareike 
Transfeld, Mission Impossible? UN Mediation in Libya, Syria and 
Yemen, SWP Research Paper 8/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, October 2018), 28–43, https://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/ 
2018RP08_Ass_EtAl.pdf. 
5 Missing in particular are the Kurdish-dominated self-
administration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the 
strongest Kurdish party, the PYD. Nor is the dominant rebel 
formation in Idlib province, the Al-Qaeda offshoot Hay’at 
Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), involved in the talks. Unlike the Kurd-
ish self-administration, however, HTS has expressed no inter-
est in participation. 
The Syrian Leadership’s 
Approach: Reconstruction 
as the Continuation of (Civil) 
War with Other Means 
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ests and priorities and as such largely represent the 
continuation of (civil) war with other means.6 
Damascus aims to cement 
demographic changes, reward 
loyalty and compensate its 
international supporters. 
The Syrian leadership initiated the reconstruction 
phase already in autumn 2017. Consolidating its grip 
on power is its prime concern. Rather than compre-
hensive nation-wide reconstruction, the objective is 
to employ limited means in a politico-economic logic. 
With most of Syria’s oil and gas fields and agricultural 
land still outside the regime’s control, its strategy 
concentrates on real estate and buildings. Reconstruc-
tion efforts are directed towards cementing the popu-
lation transfers that have occurred in the course of 
fighting, forced displacement and so-called reconcilia-
tion agreements; rewarding the loyalty of old and 
new elites through lucrative investment opportuni-
ties; and compensating the regime’s international 
supporters with access to Syria’s resources.7 What 
the Syrian leadership has not initiated is any process 
addressing crimes committed during the conflict, 
transitional justice measures or reconciliation be-
tween the population groups, nor structural reforms 
to enhance inclusion, participation and rule of law. 
On the contrary, grave human rights violations and 
war crimes continue.8 
 
6 See Khalil El-Hariri, “War by Other Means” (Beirut: 
Carnegie Middle East Centre, Diwan, 17 June 2019), https:// 
carnegie-mec.org/diwan/79297 (accessed 6 March 2020); 
Synaps Network, “War by Other Means – Syria’s Economic 
Struggle”, September 2019, http://www.synaps.network/ 
syria-economic-battleground (accessed 30 January 2020); 
Raymond Hinnebusch, “The Battle over Syria’s Recon-
struction”, Global Policy 11, no. 1 (2020): 113–23. 
7 For an analysis of the regime’s approach, see Salam Said 
and Jihad Yazigi, The Reconstruction of Syria: Socially Just Re-Inte-
gration and Peace Building or Regime Re-Consolidation? Inter-
national Policy Analysis (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 
December 2018), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/14939.pdf 
(accessed 6 March 2020). 
8 The documented crimes committed in Syria by the 
regime and armed groups include in particular besiegement 
and starvation of civilian populations; deliberate targeting 
of civilians and civilian facilities; arbitrary detention, dis-
appearance and torture; forced displacement and forced 
resettlement; looting; and the use of banned weapons. For 
a documentation see the regular reports at: United Nations 
Human Rights Council, “Independent International Com-
Politicised Reconstruction 
In this vein, few of the development projects initiated 
by Damascus are designed to restore buildings and 
neighbourhoods for their former residents or to en-
able refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
to return. The intention instead is to consolidate 
patronage networks of old and new regime supporters 
in the population and among the economic elites. At 
the same time, population groups that are regarded as 
(potentially) unreliable experience collective punish-
ment and displacement, especially in political and 
strategically important areas – such as the suburbs 
of Damascus. This approach will both deepen pre-
existing socio-political cleavages and create new ones. 
Since 2011 the regime has issued more than sixty 
laws and decrees regulating housing, land and prop-
erty rights (HLP), urban planning, and investment 
issues.9 Together they form the legal framework for 
reconstruction and grant the government powers, 
such as the authority to designate development zones 
where private property can be expropriated.10 
 
mission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic”, https:// 
www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/ 
Documentation.aspx (accessed 31 January 2020); on the 
use of chemical weapons: Organisation for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), OPCW Releases First Report by 
Investigation and Identification Team, 8 April 2020, https://www. 
opcw.org/media-centre/news/2020/04/opcw-releases-first-
report-investigation-and-identification-team (accessed 10 
April 2020). 
9 For details see the unpublished study by the Gesellschaft 
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Housing, Land and 
Property Issues in Syria and Resulting Fields of Actions for Ongoing or 
Planned Programs of German Development Cooperation (May 2018). 
10 This includes the internationally controversial Law 
No. 10 of April 2018 (amended in November 2018), which 
forms the basis for expropriations in connection with recon-
struction. Further relevant provisions in this context include 
Law No. 3 of 2018, which empowers a government com-
mittee to earmark buildings for demolition; Decree 63, 
which enables the government to freeze assets and seize 
property of (alleged) members of the opposition under the 
Counter-terrorism Law of 2012, and Decree 66 of 2012 on 
development zones. See Human Rights Watch, Rigging the 
System: Government Policies Co-Opt Aid and Reconstruction Funding 
in Syria (June 2019), 43–46, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/ 
local/2012220/syria0619_web4. pdf (accessed 30 January 
2020); Human Rights Watch, “Q&A: Syria’s New Property 
Law”, 29 May 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/29/ 
qa-syrias-new-property-law (accessed 30 January 2020); 
Joseph Daher, Decree 66 and the Impact of Its National Expansion 
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Damascus has used these powers not only to seize 
land and buildings on a large scale without adequate 
transparency or compensation (and as such prevented 
IDPs and refugees returning to strategic locales),11 but 
also demolished whole neighbourhoods, above all in 
the Damascus suburbs, in Homs and in East Aleppo. 
Rather than repairing war damage, such state devel-
opment projects are designed to alter the composi-
tion of the population, generally to the detriment 
of groups perceived as poorer and less loyal. Many 
Syrians find it impossible to register property rights 
because they live (or lived) in informal settlements 
without deeds, or because their documents were lost 
while fleeing or through the destruction of land 
registries. It is estimated that informal settlements 
account for at least 30 to 40 percent of Syria’s hous-
ing.12 In addition, logistical difficulties and security 
concerns leave many IDPs and refugees unable to 
make an appointment with the authorities. 
Regime supporters among the economic elites are 
offered profitable investment opportunities, often in 
luxury housing developments.13 In the process mem-
bers of the old elites and a new class of war profiteers 
have acquired monopolies in central sectors of the 
economy; the president’s cousin Rami Makhluf and 
Mohamed Hamsho belong to the former, Samer al-Foz 
 
(Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council, 7 March 2018), https:// 
atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/decree-66-and-the-
impact-of-its-national-expansion/ (accessed 30 January 2020); 
“Amendments to Law No. 10/2018 and Legislative Decree 
No. 66/2012 in Syria”, Syrian Legal Development Programme – 
Human Rights and Business Unit, https://www.hrbu.syrianldp. 
com/post/amendments-to-law-nr-10-2018-and-legislative-
decree-nr-66-2012-in-syria (accessed 30 January 2020). 
11 Human Rights Watch, Syria: Residents Blocked From 
Returning (16 October 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/ 
2018/10/16/syria-residents-blocked-returning (accessed 
30 January 2020). 
12 Samir Aita, “Reconstruction as a Political-Economy 
Issue: The Case of Syria”, Cairo Review of Global Affairs, 
18 September 2019, https://www.thecairoreview.com/tahrir-
forum/reconstruction-as-a-political-economy-issue-the-case-
of-syria/ (accessed 30 January 2020). 
13 This applies for example to the Marota City project 
in the Damascus suburb of Basateen al-Razi, see “Luxury 
Marota City Project Shows Blueprint for Syria’s Rebuilding 
Plans”, Arab News, 6 November 2018, https://www.arabnews. 
com/node/1399411/middle-east (accessed 30 January 2020); 
Rashmee Roshan Lall, “Rebuilding Syria, One Luxury Hotel 
at a Time”, Arab Weekly, 21 September 2019, https://thearab 
weekly.com/rebuilding-syria-one-luxury-hotel-time (accessed 
30 January 2020). 
and the Katerji brothers to the latter. This has oc-
curred in an economy suffering under sanctions, 
capital flight and contraction as a result of the armed 
conflict and international punitive measures, and 
plagued more strongly than ever by nepotism, corrup-
tion, lawlessness, informality, criminality and legal 
insecurity. A central role is played by the “conflict 
elites”,14 in the sense of local actors whose relation-
ships to politicians, the administration, the security 
apparatus and local militias allowed them to play a 
decisive role during the fighting, mediating trans-
actions for example between areas controlled by dif-
ferent forces or with foreign entities. They now play 
a prominent role in reconstruction, even if the gov-
ernment does also take targeted action against promi-
nent individuals in these circles.15 
On the other side, attempts to persuade Syrian 
entrepreneurs living abroad to begin investing in 
Syria again have failed to date. The principal reason 
for this is the country’s politico-economic circum-
stances, which in addition to the aforementioned 
problems also include a restrictive investment en-
vironment and a lack of reliable property guaran-
 
14 Samer Abboud, The Economics of War and Peace in Syria 
(New York: Century Foundation, Report 31 January 2017), 
https://tcf.org/content/report/economics-war-peace-syria/ 
?agreed=1 (accessed 30 January 2020). 
15 See also the unpublished study by the Syrian consulting 
firm Etana, The Business Base of the Syrian Regime: Frontmen, Shell 
Companies and Reconstruction (May 2019). In the course of 2019 
the Syrian leadership began taking very public action against 
members of the business elites. This included action against 
corruption and money laundering, enforcing taxes and levies, 
and confiscating assets. It does not, however, represent a 
fundamental untangling of the intimate networks of politi-
cal and economic elites. See, for example, “Assad Orders 
Measures against Rami Makhlouf’s Companies”, Asharq 
Al-Awsat, 27 August 2019, https://aawsat.com/english/home/ 
article/1875991/assad-orders-measures-against-rami-makh 
louf%E2%80%99s-companies (accessed 30 January 2020); 
Chloe Cornish, “The Men Making a Fortune from Syria’s 
War”, Financial Times, 3 October 2019, https://www.ft.com/ 
content/525ec4e4-e4a3-11e9-9743-db5a370481bc (accessed 
30 January 2020); “Syrian Government Seizes Assets of Busi-
nessman Rami Makhlouf”, Al Jazeera, 24 December 2019, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/syrian-government-
seizes-assets-businessman-rami-makhlouf-191224155408157. 
html (accessed 30 January 2020); Kheder Khaddour, “The 
Wrath of Caesar”, Diwan blog (Carnegie Middle East Center, 
1 June 2020), https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/81946 (accessed 
10 July 2020). 
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tees.16 Transparency International ranked Syria as 
the world’s third most corrupt country in 2019.17 
According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 
the draft investment law published in 2019 would at 
least slightly improve the investment environment. 
It is designed to reduce bureaucracy and create 
incentives by reducing import tariffs and improving 
access to financing.18 Still, Syria occupies 176th place 
(out of 190) in the World Bank’s “Doing Business 
2020” Ranking.19 Even if individual improvements 
were achieved in 2018/2019,20 substantial progress on 
repatriating capital is unlikely without significantly 
deeper reforms that would make guarantees against 
asset seizures credible.21 
International Aid on a Short Leash 
At the same time, the legal and political framework 
for international assistance established by the regime 
ensures that, in the areas it controls, humanitarian 
and development organisations cannot operate in-
dependently.  
The regime decides who supplies 
international aid, where it goes, 
and who profits. 
Damascus decides who supplies international aid, 
where it goes, and who profits. In this way it can be 
 
16 Joseph Daher, The Political Context of Syria’s Reconstruction: 
A Prospective in Light of a Legacy of Unequal Development (Florence: 
European University Institute [EUI], December 2018), https:// 
cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/60112 (accessed 6 March 2020). 
17 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 
2019, https://www.transparency.org/cpi2019 (accessed 26 Feb-
ruary 2020). 
18 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Report Syria 
(January 2020), 6. 
19 World Bank Group, Doing Business 2020, https://www. 
doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/pdf/db2020/ 
Doing-Business-2020_rankings.pdf (accessed 26 February 
2020). 
20 World Bank Group, Economy Profile Syrian Arab Republic – 
Doing Business 2020, 61, https://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
content/dam/doingBusiness/country/s/syria/SYR.pdf (accessed 
26 February 2020). 
21 Abboud, The Economics of War and Peace in Syria (see note 
14); Katherine Nazemi and Alexander Decina, “No Business 
as Usual in Syria” (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, Sada Blog, 20 June 2019), https:// 
carnegieendowment.org/sada/79351 (accessed 6 March 2020). 
sure that humanitarian aid is distributed as it would 
wish – to secure the allegiance of businesspeople 
and population groups regarded as loyal, and to pun-
ish others. The latter applies in particular to residents 
of former rebel strongholds such as the Damascus 
suburb of Duma and East Aleppo.22 
In this vein, the regime places heavy restrictions on 
international organisations, especially their access to 
population groups in need of assistance. It regularly 
denies requests for field visits, needs assessments, 
monitoring and evaluation (or simply ignores them), 
and the same applies to permission to conduct cross-
frontline operations.23 In order to carry out their work, 
international organisations are required to cooperate 
with local partners approved by the regime. These are 
the relevant ministries, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent 
(SARC) and “NGOs” like the Syria Trust for Development, 
which is headed by the president’s wife Asma al-Assad 
who is subject to EU and US sanctions.24 These actors 
 
22 For an analysis of this approach and examples of how 
international aid is distributed in terms of regime stability 
rather than need, see Haid Haid, Principled Aid in Syria: A 
Framework for International Agencies (London: Chatham House, 
July 2019), 5–10, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/ 
default/files/2019-07-04-PrincipledAidSyria.pdf (accessed 
30 March 2020); Human Rights Watch, Rigging the System 
(see note 10). 
23 According to Haid Haid, for example, in 2015 the Syrian 
leadership ignored no less than 75 percent of UN requests 
to supply aid, and only half of the requests which were 
answered actually resulted in a delivery; see Haid, Principled 
Aid in Syria (see note 22), 6. In 2017 Damascus approved only 
27 percent of UN requests to supply aid, in the first four 
months of 2018 just 7 percent, see Lisa Barrington, “2018 
Worst Year in Syria’s Humanitarian Crisis: U.N. Official”, 
Reuters, 18 May 2018. According to humanitarian organisa-
tions the access situation has not improved noticeably since 
then; telephone conversation between author and repre-
sentative of Human Rights Watch, February 2020. On 
Damascus’s politicisation of humanitarian aid see also José 
Ciro Martínez and Brent Eng, “The Unintended Consequences 
of Emergency Food Aid: Neutrality, Sovereignty and Politics 
in the Syrian Civil War, 2012–15”, International Affairs 92, 
no. 1 (2016): 153–73; Reinoud Leenders and Kholoud Man-
sour, “Humanitarianism, State Sovereignty, and Authoritarian 
Regime Maintenance in the Syrian War”, Political Science Quar-
terly 133, no. 2 (2018): 225–57, https://onlinelibrary.wiley. 
com/doi/full/10.1002/polq.12773 (accessed 10 April 2020). 
24 For an overview of needs, donors, regional distribution 
and implementation partners for international aid, see UN 
OCHA, “Syrian Arab Republic – Organizations Implement-
ing Humanitarian Activities Based within Syria”, 2019, 
http://www.ocha-sy.org/4wspresence2019.html; idem., “Inter-
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are often under the influence of the security appa-
ratus – which is responsible for grave human rights 
violations – and/or function as fronts for government 
officials, army officers or militias. The programmes of 
international organisations and their concrete execu-
tion have to be approved in detail – and sometimes 
also implemented – by these gatekeepers. What is 
more, Damascus has also undermined the independ-
ence of international organisations, for example by 
intervening in their recruitment and procurement 
to the benefit of pro-regime entrepreneurs (some of 
whom are subject to EU/US sanctions). This diverts 
international aid to finance those responsible for 
human rights violations, at least to an extent. 
 
active Humanitarian Response Dashboard (within Syria)”, 
2019, http://www.ocha-sy.org/4wsresponse2019. html; idem., 
“Syrian Arab Republic – Communitites and Key Facts (HNO 
2019)”, 2019, http://www.ocha-sy.org/findlocation.html (all 
accessed 31 January 2020); on cooperation with front orga-
nisations of the Assad regime, see also Khaled Yacoub Oweis, 
“UNHCR on Aid to Syria: What’s Important Is to Deliver”, 
The National, 15 July 2019, https://www.thenational.ae/world/ 
mena/unhcr-on-aid-to-syria-what-s-important-is-to-deliver-
1.886179 (accessed 6 March 2020). 
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Russia and Iran 
The regime in Damascus has made it abundantly 
clear that it will accept foreign engagement in recon-
struction only from countries that took its side in the 
civil war and grant assistance without conditionality.25 
But Russia and Iran are struggling with their own 
economic crises, also caused in part by sanctions. 
They are in no position to fund a comprehensive re-
construction in Syria. Rather, the memoranda of 
understanding (MoUs) that Tehran and Moscow have 
signed with Damascus have two principal aims: Both 
governments want to recoup the costs of participating 
in the war through resource extraction and a share in 
lucrative investment projects. And both are looking to 
secure their long-term strategic interests with military 
bases and control of ports and transport links. At the 
same time the interests and strategic objectives of 
the Assad regime’s two main partners are not always 
identical but at times contradictory.26 Russia priori-
tises reinforcing (central) state functions and has 
 
25 See for example the statement by the Syrian prime 
minister: “Khamis: Investment Opportunities Will Be Given 
to Countries That Stood by Syria”, SANA (Syrian Arab News 
Agency), 8 August 2017, https://sana.sy/en/?p=111457 (accessed 
26 February 2020). 
26 For more detail on the different approaches and methods 
employed by Moscow and Tehran, see Sinan Hatahet, Russia 
and Iran: Economic Influence in Syria (London: Chatham House, 
March 2019), https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/ 
russia-and-iran-economic-influence-syria (accessed 26 Feb-
ruary 2020); Faysal Itani, “Geo-Economics: Russia and Iran 
in Syria” (Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council, 17 May 2019), 
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/ 
faysal-itani-in-syria-studies-geo-economics-russia-and-iran-in-
syria/ (accessed 26 February 2020); Anton Mardasov, “Are 
Russia, Iran Engaged in Tug of War over Syria?” Al Monitor, 
30 January 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fa/ 
originals/2019/01/russia-iran-syria-rivalry.html (accessed 
31 January 2020). 
concentrated on reforming and upgrading the Syrian 
security sector.27 Iran places greater weight on streng-
thening allied militias and bolstering its ties with 
local communities to entrench its influence in Syria. 
Both countries have signed MOUs on investments 
in Syria. These concentrate on the oil, gas, minerals, 
electricity, agriculture and tourism sectors. In some 
cases Iran and Russia find themselves competing over 
profitable concessions, above all for phosphate min-
ing and in the oil and gas sector.28 Tehran has signed 
MoUs with Damascus to develop the port at Latakia, 
construct several power stations and establish a third 
mobile phone network. Moscow has secured agree-
ments to expand and manage the naval base at Tar-
tus, mine phosphates near Palmyra and operate a 
fertiliser plant in Homs. Russia has also secured 
exclusive exploration and drilling rights for oil and 
gas in Syria and its coastal waters. Iran has made 
slower progress than Russia on realising economic 
projects, but remains influential as a major trading 
partner and supplier of petroleum products. 
 
27 See Yury Barnim, Reforming the Syrian Arab Army: Russia’s 
Vision, Discussion Paper 4 (Geneva and Istanbul: Geneva 
Center for Strategic Policy [GCSP] and Omran Centre for Stra-
tegic Studies, March 2019), 3f., https://dam.gcsp.ch/files/ 
2y10s7R3ZIZ5bgMFacQKkFx7E3XAdDccH5OSWyZGupATj 
EocJRepTEy (accessed 2 March 2020). On Russia’s interests 
and approaches in general, also Joost Hiltermann, Andrey 
Kortunov, Ruslan Mamedov and Tatyana Shmeleva, Squaring 
the Circle: Russian and European Views on Syrian Reconstruction 
(Moscow: Russian International Affairs Council, 5 June 2019), 
https://russiancouncil.ru/en/activity/publications/squaring-
the-circle-russian-and-european-views-on-syrian-recon 
struction/?sphrase_id=29878654 (accessed 31 January 2020). 
28 Hamidreza Azizi and Leonid Issaev, Russian and Iranian 
Economic Interests in Syria (Pre-2010 and Intra-war Period), Dis-
cussion Paper 8 (Geneva and Istanbul: GCSP and Omran 
Centre for Strategic Studies, May 2019), https://dam.gcsp.ch/ 
files/2y10nlGNuebJ3zh4kU5wS7N66uuFm35TYDmJjO9jyzKVQ
YbDoO7vybkfq (accessed 24 March 2020). 
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Iran has also granted the Assad regime sizeable 
loans in recent years, while Russia supplied financial 
resources to support the currency. But neither pos-
sesses the resources to finance Syria’s reconstruction. 
As a consequence Moscow has been seeking to per-
suade others to shoulder that burden, directing its 
requests in particular to Europe and the Arab Gulf 
states. The Russians calculate that this would not only 
reduce their own burden in stabilising the country, 
but also potentially pave the way for the international 
rehabilitation of Bashar al-Assad. Moscow has clearly 
communicated to Europe that it expects it to dis-
mantle sanctions and support reconstruction – and 
that these steps are in Europe’s own interest because, 
the Kremlin argues, that is the only plausible path 
to stability and eventually allowing the refugees to 
return.29 
Turkey 
Turkey is the main international actor engaged in 
actual reconstruction in Syria. But its activities are 
restricted to the areas of northern Syria that it brought 
under its control – along with the allied militias of 
the Syrian National Army (SNA, which emerged from 
the Free Syrian Army, FSA) – in the course of the 
military interventions of 2016, 2018 and 2019.30 
Ankara’s prime objective is to permanently prevent a 
contiguous Kurdish self-administration under the 
 
29 “Putin Urges Europe to Help Rebuild Syria So Refugees 
Can Return”, Guardian, 18 August 2018, https://www. 
theguardian.com/global/2018/aug/18/putin-urges-europe-to-
help-rebuild-syria-so-refugees-can-return (accessed 31 Janu-
ary 2020); Diana Hodali, “Rebuilding Assad’s Syria: Who 
Should Foot the Bill?”, Deutsche Welle, 8 September 2018, 
https://www.dw.com/en/rebuilding-assads-syria-who-should-
foot-the-bill/a-45389963 (accessed 31 January 2020). 
30 See Map on page 33. On the different circumstances and 
approaches in the areas under Turkish control, see Khay-
rallah al-Hilu, Afrin under Turkish Control: Political, Economic 
and Social Transformations (Florence: EUI, July 2019), https:// 
cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/63745 (accessed 10 March 2020); 
Engin Yüksel and Erwin van Veen, Turkey in Northwestern 
Syria (The Hague: Clingendael, 4 June 2019), https://www. 
clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2019-06/PB_Turkey_in_ 
Northwestern_Syria_June_2019.pdf (accessed 10 March 
2020); Gregory Waters, Between Ankara and Damascus: The 
Role of the Turkish State in North Aleppo, (Washington, D.C.: 
Middle East Institute, 20 June 2019), https://www.mei.edu/ 
publications/between-ankara-and-damascus-role-turkish-
state-north-aleppo (accessed 6 March 2020). 
dominant Kurdish PYD party, and to create instead an 
alternative local elite loyal to Turkey. 
Accordingly, Turkey has established new security 
structures in the areas it controls. The SNA is de facto 
under Ankara’s command. Turkey is also training 
civil police to deploy there, and has established mili-
tary police units to tackle excesses committed by SNA 
forces.31 And it has replaced the institutions of the 
PYD-dominated self-administration with local coun-
cils that exclude not only the PYD but also represen-
tatives of the Kurdish National Council (KNC) and 
Kurdish activists who are critical of Turkey. The oppo-
sition Syrian Interim Government (SIG) plays only a 
nominal role. The new structures created by Ankara 
are largely integrated into the Turkish administra-
tion. Like the security structures they are funded 
mainly by revenues from the Turkish-Syrian border 
crossings. 
Turkey coordinates and controls humanitarian aid 
on the ground through its disaster and emergency 
agency AFAD. It has also invested massively in infra-
structure rehabilitation, education and health – 
above all in the area occupied in 2016 in Operation 
Euphrates Shield – in order to provide public ser-
vices to the population. Neighbouring Turkish pro-
vinces and entrepreneurs are active there. Armed 
groups also play a prominent role in economic rela-
tions. The involved Turkish actors see Syria above all 
as a market for Turkish products and an investment 
opportunity for Turkish capital. Their interest in 
reviving local economic structures is less enthusiastic. 
What is more, against the backdrop of the meltdown 
of Syria’s currency, over the last few years the use of 
the Turkish lira has become widespread in the areas 
controlled by Turkey or allied militias.32 
In northern Syria Ankara apparently 
wants a buffer zone under permanent 
Turkish control. 
In the course of Turkey’s military operations local 
Kurds were expelled from Kurdish-majority areas (and 
not all of them have been allowed to return since). In 
their place IDPs have been resettled, for example 
 
31 Al-Hilu, Afrin Under Turkish Control (see note 30), 5f. 
32 Marie Jégo and Laure Stephan, “La Turquie consolide 
sa présence en Syrie à travers sa monnaie”, Le Monde, 7 July 
2020, 5. 
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from the suburbs of Damascus and Aleppo.33 It would 
also appear that Ankara’s plan to resettle Syrian refu-
gees in north-eastern Syria is intended not only to 
reduce the financial and societal costs of accommo-
dating them in Turkey but also to permanently alter 
the composition of the region’s population to the 
detriment of the Kurds.34 
In principle Ankara’s approach in northern Syria 
appears to be driven by the intention to establish a 
buffer zone under permanent Turkish control. That is 
a venture that would create lasting conflict between 
Ankara and Damascus. The risk of a protracted guer-
rilla conflict is also present: already, the PYD’s 
People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, 
YPG) have responded to Turkish military and cleans-
ing operations with attacks intended to destabilise 
Ankara’s occupation, reconstruction projects and 
the local councils it established. Turkey’s military 
operations in cooperation with the SNA have also 
further exacerbated ethnic tensions between Kurds 
and Arabs in Syria. 
China 
Beijing has expanded its humanitarian aid in Syria 
since 2017, and laid the groundwork for future eco-
nomic relations.35 That year China hosted a trade fair 
on Syria reconstruction projects and committed US$2 
billion for establishing industrial parks there. In 2018 
it promised US$23 billion in loans and donations for 
Arab countries, including Syria. Business delegations 
have visited in both directions. China’s policy towards 
Syria is largely guided by two objectives. Firstly Bei-
jing wants to develop an economic partnership com-
patible with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In that 
context China has been expanding the Mediterranean 
 
33 Even before Turkey’s military operations, flight and 
forced displacement had caused significant changes in the 
composition of the population in the Kurdish-dominated 
areas. See overview in al-Hilu, Afrin under Turkish Control 
(see note 30), 14ff. 
34 Sinem Adar, Repatriation to Turkey’s “Safe Zone” in Northeast 
Syria, SWP Comment 1/2020 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, January 2020), https://www.swp-berlin.org/ 
10.18449/2020C01/ (accessed 10 March 2020). 
35 For more detail, see John Calabrese, Syria and China: In 
War and Reconstruction (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Insti-
tute, July 2019), https://www.mei.edu/publications/china-and-
syria-war-and-reconstruction (accessed 31 January 2020), also 
for the figures in the following. 
port of Tripoli (Lebanon) since 2012 and expressed 
interest in reopening the Tripoli-Homs railway line. 
Secondly Beijing also hopes that good relations with 
Damascus will help it to suppress transnational jihad-
ism, specifically preventing the return of Uighurs who 
have been fighting with the jihadist rebels in Syria. 
But when it comes to actually going ahead with 
major investments in Syria, China has been cautious. 
Few of its promises of aid, investment and loans have 
actually materialised. And major Chinese investments 
in Syria are unlikely as long as the security situation 
remains unstable, the economic structures are charac-
terised by legal insecurity, corruption and nepotism, 
and Chinese labour and capital would therefore be at 
risk. Washington’s secondary sanctions are also likely 
to deter China from cooperating with Damascus; one 
indication of this is the withdrawal of companies that 
have apparently been operating as fronts for the Chi-
nese technology company Huawei in Syria and Iran.36 
Arab Gulf states 
The Arab Gulf states were Syria’s biggest investors 
until 2011. But they too have hesitated to re-engage. 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain did 
execute a U-turn at the end of 2018, reopening their 
embassies in Damascus and signing various MOUs 
with the Syrian regime during a series of mutual 
visits.37 The Gulf states – together with Egypt and 
 
36 Steve Stecklow, Babak Dehghanpisheh and James Pom-
fret, “Exclusive: New Documents Link Huawei to Suspected 
Front Companies in Iran, Syria”, Reuters, 8 January 2019, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-iran-exclusive/ 
exclusive-new-documents-link-huawei-to-suspected-front-
companies-in-iran-syria-idUSKCN1P21MH; Steve Stecklow 
and Moira Warburton, “Key Events in Huawei CFO Meng 
Wanzhou’s Extradition Case”, Reuters, 20 January 2020, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-huawei-tech-events-
timeline/key-events-in-huawei-cfo-meng-wanzhous-extra 
dition-case-idUSKBN1ZJ15Z; Pan Yuanyuan, “The Looming 
Threat of Sanctions for Chinese Companies in Iran”, 
The Diplomat, 1 February 2020, https://thediplomat.com/ 
2020/02/the-looming-threat-of-sanctions-for-chinese-
companies-in-iran/ (all accessed 3 February 2020). 
37 Taylor Luck, “Postwar Syria? Arab World Moving to 
Bring Damascus Back into the Fold”, Christian Science Monitor, 
19 January 2019, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-
East/2019/0117/Postwar-Syria-Arab-world-moving-to-bring-
Damascus-back-into-the-fold. For more detail on the UAE, see 
Joseph Daher, The Dynamics and Evolution of UAE-Syria Relations: 
Between Expectations and Obstacles (Florence: EUI, October 2019); 
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Jordan and with Russian support – have also argued 
for Syria’s suspension from the Arab League to be 
lifted, to date without success.38 The background here 
is that the Gulf monarchies possess a great interest in 
curtailing Iranian and Turkish influence in Syria – 
even if they have themselves begun to seek an under-
standing with Tehran in light of Washington’s in-
creasingly erratic policy in the Gulf. But few Gulf 
Arab investment projects in Syria have yet been oper-
ationalised, let alone realised. And the aforementioned 
obstacles created by secondary sanctions and Syria’s 
politico-economic structures also hinder financial 
flows from the Gulf monarchies (and from other 
potentially interested countries). It also seems as if 
Washington may have intervened directly, in particu-
lar to block any thawing of relations between Syria 
and Saudi Arabia.39 An additional factor is that the 
state budgets of the Gulf monarchies have been 
drained by the repercussions of the Covid-19 pan-
demic, in particular the collapse of oil sales and the 
 
Kinda Makieh, “UAE Firms Scout Trade at Syria Fair, Defying 
U.S. Pressure”, Reuters, 31 August 2019, https://www.reuters. 
com/article/us-syria-emirates/uae-firms-scout-trade-at-syria-
fair-defying-u-s-pressure-idUSKCN1VL0HB. For Bahrain, 
“Damascus ‘Grants Bahraini Royal’ Lucrative Business Deal 
as Gulf Regimes Rally round Syria’s Assad”, New Arab, 3 April 
2019, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2019/4/3/syria-
regime-rewards-bahraini-rapprochement-with-royal-business-
deal (all accessed 30 March 2020). 
38 Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Support Lacking to Readmit 
Syrian Regime to Arab League, Group’s Head Says”, The 
National, 25 December 2019, https://www.thenational.ae/ 
world/support-lacking-to-readmit-syrian-regime-to-arab-league-
group-s-head-says-1.955909 (accessed 31 January 2020). For 
Egypt David Awad, “The Business of War: Egypt, Others Eye 
Reconstruction Bids”, Al Monitor, 12 September 2017, https:// 
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fr/originals/2017/09/egypt-invest-
reconstruction-process-syria-iraq.html#ixzz6Cc BQmmns 
(all accessed 31 January 2020). 
39 Daher, The Dynamics and Evolution of UAE-Syria Relations 
(see note 37), 12; “U.S. Pressing Gulf States to Keep Syria 
Isolated: Sources”, Reuters, 19 February 2019, https://www. 
reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-gulf/u-s-pressing-
gulf-states-to-keep-syria-isolated-sources-idUSKCN1Q70VO; 
Hussein Bakeer and Giorgio Cafiero, “Bashar al-Assad and 
the Greater Arab World”, Atlantic Council website, 8 Feb-
ruary 2019), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ 
syriasource/bashar-al-assad-and-the-greater-arab-world/; Sami 
Moubayed, “Iran Ties Hinder Gulf Normalisation with Syria”, 
Arab Weekly, 22 December 2019, https://thearabweekly.com/ 
iran-ties-hinder-gulf-normalisation-syria (all accessed 30 
March 2020). 
likely loss of pilgrimage revenues. This will also con-
strain the ability of these states to raise significant 
sums for Syrian reconstruction at least in the short 
to medium term. 
Syria’s Neighbours 
Other countries in the region possess a strong interest 
in seeing the country stabilise, refugees return and 
bilateral trade relations resume. This applies first and 
foremost to Syria’s neighbours Lebanon, Jordan and 
Iraq. Lebanon in particular hopes to profit directly 
from Syrian reconstruction. But that does not mean 
that any of the three can be expected to make rele-
vant investments, given that they are each facing 
their own serious economic and internal challenges. 
Israel is the only neighbour with which Syria is 
officially at war, having occupied the Syrian Golan 
Heights since 1967 (and annexed the territory in 
1981). Israel has no intention (or possibility) of be-
coming involved in reconstruction. But it can be ex-
pected to continue its efforts to weaken Iran’s diplo-
matic and military influence in Syria.40 
The United States 
Since 2017 the United States under President Donald 
Trump has successively scaled down its ambitions in 
Syria. Today it is involved above all to prevent a resur-
gence of IS and to counter Iranian influence. In this 
vein, it is engaged on the ground, with patrols in north-
eastern Syria, a presence in al-Tanf on the Iraqi bor-
der, and limited stabilisation assistance in the areas 
liberated from IS east of the Euphrates. It also sup-
plies humanitarian aid.41 At the same time, Washing-
ton has clearly signalled its lack of interest in con-
 
40 Gil Murciano, Preventing a Spill-over of the Iran-Israel Conflict 
in Syria: E3 + Russia Should Lead the Way Out, SWP Comment 
27/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2018), 
https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/preventing-a-
spillover-of-the-iran-israel-conflict-in-syria/ (accessed 10 April 
2020). 
41 “House Hearing on U.S. Policy towards Syria” [video], C-
Span, 23 October 2019, https://www.c-span.org/video/?465609-
1/house-hearing-us-policy-syria (accessed 27 February 2020); 
Congressional Research Service (CRS), Armed Conflict in Syria: 
Overview and U.S. Response, CRS Report (Washington, D.C., 12 
February 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33487.pdf 
(accessed 27 February 2020). 
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tributing to Syria’s reconstruction.42 Instead in 2019 it 
expanded its “maximum pressure” campaign to Syria 
with a new set of direct and secondary sanctions (so-
called Caesar sanctions), warning others against co-
operating with the Assad regime or with individuals 
responsible for grave human rights violations.43 In 
June 2020, the sanctions and a first batch of designa-
tions of individuals and entities went into effect.44 
Interim Conclusion 
The regional and global powers involved in Syria have 
irreconcilable geopolitical interests and visions for 
Syria’s political and societal order. In addition, the 
impact of the Covid-19 pandemic will significantly 
reduce the revenues of the Arab Gulf states, which 
could otherwise (at least theoretically) have been 
potential investors. Thus sufficient funding for early 
and comprehensive reconstruction should not be 
expected. Rather both the Syrian leadership and 
 
42 See, for example, Natasha Turak, “No US Assistance on 
Syria Reconstruction until Iran Is Out: Top US Diplomat”, 
CNBC, 19 January 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/12/no-
us-assistance-on-syria-reconstruction-until-iran-is-out-top-us-
diplomat.html (accessed 31 January 2020); Karen DeYoung 
and Shane Harris, “Trump Instructs Military to Begin Plan-




49fe3c675a89_story.html (accessed 26 February 2020). 
43 US Congress, “Title LXXIV – Caesar Syria Civilian 
Protection Act of 2019”, National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2020 (December 2019), 2611–35, https://rules. 
house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/CRPT-
116hrpt333.pdf (accessed 29 January 2020); see also the 
Statement of Secretary of State Pompeo, U.S. State Depart-
ment, “Passage of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act 
of 2019”, press statement Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of 
State, 20 December 2019, https://www.state.gov/passage-of-
the-caesar-syria-civilian-protection-act-of-2019/ (accessed 
29 January 2020). 
44 U.S. State Department fact sheet: https://www.state.gov/ 
caesar-syria-civilian-protection-act/; for the initial round 
of designations: https://www.state.gov/syria-caesar-act-
designations/. For the US approach see also the transcript 
of an event at the Hudson Institute with US Syria envoy 
James Jeffrey, 12 May 2020, https://www.hudson.org/ 
research/16032-transcript-maximum-pressure-on-the-assad-
regime-for-its-chemical-weapons-use-and-other-atrocities 
(all accessed 11 July 2020). 
external actors treat reconstruction as the continua-
tion of (civil) war by other means. Tensions are likely 
to grow – even between Damascus and its allies 
in Moscow and Tehran – concerning priorities, ap-
proaches and profits. Even after the fighting has 
ended rehabilitation and reconstruction will therefore 
remain fragmented, localised and driven by particular 
interests. The needs of local populations, as well as 
those of refugees and IDPs, are likely to come second 
to profit-seeking and politico-economic and geostra-
tegic interests. The political and social dimensions of 
reconstruction (transitional justice, reconciliation) 
will remain absent.45 This is unlikely to lead to long-
term stabilisation. 
 
45 On the irreconcilable geopolitical interests of the rele-
vant actors and the resulting discrepancy between challenges 
and offers in connection with reconstruction, see also Erwin 
van Veen, The Geopolitics of Syria’s Reconstruction: A Case of Ma-
tryoshka (The Hague: Clingendael, April 2019). 
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It is estimated that reconstruction will cost US$250 to 
US$400 billion or even US$1 trillion, depending on 
the source.46 But what does reconstruction actually 
mean? The armed conflict that began in 2011 follow-
ing the violent suppression of a protest movement 
leaves Syria facing enormous challenges. These, the 
relevant UN institutions, the World Bank, researchers 
and Syrian civil society largely agree, extend far 
beyond mine clearance and physical reconstruction 
of infrastructure and housing.47 In particular it is 
necessary to create the conditions for the different 
parts of society to live together in peace, to compen-
sate the losses of human capital and human develop-
ment, and to restart the economy and basic public 
services. 
War Damage and Its Consequences 
The war has wreaked great destruction on Syria’s 
infrastructure. The energy sector (including oil and 
gas production and electricity generation) has been 
especially badly affected, as have transport links, 
 
46 US$250 billion: “Security Council Briefing on the 
Situation in Syria, Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura”, United 
Nations Department of Political Affairs, 27 November 2017, 
https://www.un.org/undpa/en/speeches-statements/ 
27112017/syria (accessed 28 January 2020); US$400 billion: 
“President al-Assad in Interview to Russian NTV Channel: 
Any Constitutional Reform in Syria Is a Wholly Syrian Matter”, 
SANA, 24 June 2018, https://sana.sy/en/?p=140830 (accessed 
28 January 2020); US$1 trillion: “Syria Needs $1 Trillion 
Dollars to Rebuild from the Ashes (and China Is Waiting)”, 
National Interest, 6 February 2017, https://nationalinterest. 
org/blog/the-buzz/syria-needs-1-trillion-dollars-rebuild-the-
ashes-china-19337 (accessed 28 January 2020). See also Shar-
mila Devadas, Ibrahim Elbadawi and Norman V. Loayza, 
Growth after War in Syria (Washington, D.C.: World Bank 
Group, Development Research Group, August 2019), 3, http:// 
documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/424551565105634645/
pdf/Growth-after-War-in-Syria.pdf (accessed 26 February 
2020). 
47 See the literature discussed in this section. 
water and sewerage. Housing, health, education and 
agriculture have also suffered massively. The destruc-
tion is very unevenly distributed. The worst damage is 
concentrated in areas that were contested, sometimes 
for years, and recaptured by the regime and its allies 
from the rebels or the IS. This applies in particular 
to the eastern suburbs of Damascus, to the Yarmouk 
refugee camp at the southern periphery of the capital, 
and to East Aleppo, Al-Raqqa, Homs and Hama. 
Almost all the provincial capitals have been battle-
fields at some point during the civil war; many his-
torical centres (such as the ancient city of Aleppo, 
which is listed as world heritage by UNESCO, and the 
historic centre of Homs) have been gravely damaged 
or destroyed, as have the ancient sites of Palmyra. On 
the peripheries, whole neighbourhoods and suburbs 
lie empty and ruined. In Homs, Al-Raqqa, parts of 
Aleppo and the suburbs of Damascus, aerial bombing 
has caused destruction comparable to that of the Sec-
ond World War in Europe. By 2017 the World Bank 
estimated that almost 30 percent of Syria’s buildings 
had been heavily damaged or destroyed.48 In spring 
2019 a UN report took stock of 140,000 buildings that 
had been damaged, of which 40,000 had been com-
pletely destroyed and another 50,000 severely affect-
ed.49 Services including healthcare, education, drink-
ing water and electricity are severely restricted, espe-
cially in the (formerly) contested areas. According to 
the UN, by 2018 the fighting had left almost half the 
country’s health facilities impaired or inoperable and 
one-third of schools destroyed or damaged. More than 
 
48 World Bank, The Toll of War: The Economic and Social Con-
sequences of the Conflict in Syria (Washington, D.C., 10 July 
2017), v–x, 17–75, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ 
syria/publication/the-toll-of-war-the-economic-and-social-
consequences-of-the-conflict-in-syria (accessed 29 January 
2020). 
49 For detail on damage, see United Nations Institute for 
Training and Research, Syrian Cities Damage Atlas (March 
2019), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ 
reach_thematic_assessment_syrian_cities_damage_atlas_ 
march_2019_reduced_file_size_1.pdf (accessed 29 January 
2020). 
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50 percent of the sewerage system was operating at 
reduced capacity or not at all, with about 70 percent 
of waste water discharged untreated.50 
More than half the remaining 
population lives in areas with high 
risks from unexploded ordnance. 
In Homs for example, UN Habitat reports that 
almost 54 percent of the buildings are no longer hab-
itable. Some 60 percent of neighbourhoods are no 
longer functional, because their infrastructure has 
been destroyed and basic services are lacking. As a 
result about 40 percent of the residents have moved 
to other neighbourhoods or fled the city altogether.51 
In the Yarmouk refugee camp and the surrounding 
areas of Damascus about 80 percent of the buildings 
have been destroyed; of the roughly original 800,000 
inhabitants only about 1,000 remained.52 In Aleppo 
the population fell from about 2.5 to 1.6 million, in 
the eastern suburbs of Damascus from about 390,000 
to 270,000.53 The decline was especially dramatic in 
specific suburbs of the capital: in Duma from about 
120,000 (2004) to 40,000 (2019), in Harasta from 
80,000 to 2,600 and in Arbin from 90,000 to 19,000.54 
These places are also especially severely affected by 
landmines, IEDs and unexploded ordnance. In 2019, 
according to UN OCHA, 10.2 million Syrians (more 
than half the country’s remaining population) were 
living in areas with high risk of explosion. And the 
 
50 UN OCHA Syria, 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview (March 
2019), esp. 5, 6, 28, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/ 
files/resources/2019_Syr_HNO_Full.pdf (accessed 29 January 
2020); for damage see also World Bank, The Economics of Post-
Conflict Reconstruction in MENA (Washington, D.C., 1 April 
2017), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/23540 
1491413228678/The-Economics-of-Post-Conflict-
Reconstruction-in-MENA (accessed 29 January 2020); World 
Bank, The Toll of War (see note 48), v–x, 17–75. See also 
more recent reports from the Center for Operational Analysis 
and Research (COAR) on damage, challenges and politico-
economic dynamics in individual regions of Syria at: https:// 
coar-global.org/nosap/. 
51 UN Habitat, City Profile Homs: Multi Sector Assessment (May 
2014), https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/download-
manager-files/Homs%20RCP.pdf (accessed 27 March 2020). 
52 United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 
Syrian Cities Damage Atlas (see note 49). 
53 Ibid. 
54 COAR, Eastern Ghouta: Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profile 
(July 2019), 18, https://coar-global.org/nosap/ (accessed 27 
March 2020). 
full extent of contamination with explosives had not 
even been assessed.55 Serious incidents are frequent, 
with returnees and children at particular risk, and the 
contamination creates significant problems above all 
for agriculture, rubble clearance and humanitarian 
access. 
War Economy and Sanctions 
Syria’s economy has contracted considerably in the 
course of the conflict. In 2018 the UN estimated the 
damage to the economy at more than US$388 billion: 
direct physical destruction about US$120 billion and 
loss of productivity about US$268 billion.56 In the first 
five and a half years of the war alone – from mid-
2011 to the end of 2016 – the loss of GDP amounted 
to about US$226 billion, or about four times Syria’s 
total GDP in 2010. Real GDP declined by about two-
thirds over the same period.57 
The main reasons for the decline in productivity 
were loss of production factors (in particular the 
physical destruction of factories in Aleppo, Homs and 
the Damascus suburbs), withdrawal of investment, 
loss of labour and skills, and lack of fuel, electricity 
and raw materials.58 Additionally the war economy 
shifted incentives away from productive activities.59 
War-related degradation of transport and commercial 
networks and supply chains also played a decisive 
 
55 “Syria in 2020: The Deadly Legacy of Explosive Violence 
and Its Impact on Infrastructure and Health”, ReliefWeb, 
18 December 2019, https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-
republic/syria-2020-deadly-legacy-explosive-violence-and-its-
impact (accessed 31 January 2020); “Syria – Explosive 
Hazard Contamination”, UNMAS website, March 2019, 
https://unmas.org/en/programmes/syria (accessed 29 January 
2020); UN OCHA Syria, 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview 
(see note 50), 52f. 
56 “Experts Discuss Post-conflict Reconstruction Policies 
after Political Agreement in Syria”, UNESCWA, 7 August 
2018, https://www.unescwa.org/news/syrian-experts-discuss-
post-conflict-reconstruction-policies-after-political-
agreement-syria (accessed 28 January 2020); “The Latest: 
UN Says Civil War Has Cost Syria $388B in Damage”, AP, 
9 August 2018, https://apnews.com/aa0aaa2c44cd430196f 
572227b45c150/The-Latest:-UN-says-civil-war-has-cost-Syria-
$388B-in-damage (accessed 10 February 2020). 
57 World Bank, The Toll of War (see note 48), vii. 
58 Devadas, Elbadawi and Loayza, Growth After War in 
Syria (see note 46), 33. 
59 World Bank, The Toll of War (see note 48), i. 
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role. As a consequence trade with neighbouring coun-
tries collapsed as well.60 
Investment Collapses 
Syrian oil production was largely stopped by the 
war, and most of what was left still remained outside 
Damascus’s control in early summer 2020.61 Oil was 
formerly one of Syria’s main exports and a central 
source of revenues for the state. Together with high 
military spending, the collapse of state revenues 
(because of the loss of oil and tax revenues and the 
collapse of foreign trade) led to a steep decline in 
public investment – from 9 percent of GDP in 2010 
to 0.5 percent in 2016.62 Damascus covers its budget 
and current account deficits by drawing on currency 
reserves, printing money and borrowing at preferen-
tial terms from Iran and Russia. This has in turn led 
to a noticeable increase in public debt, dwindling 
currency reserves and a dramatic devaluation of the 
Syrian pound. Before the uprising in 2011 one US 
dollar cost about 50 Syrian pounds. In October 2019 
the price reached about 630 pounds. By mid-January 
2020, against the backdrop of an escalating financial 
crisis in Lebanon, it had spiked to 1,200 pounds. By 
June 2020, with financial meltdown in Lebanon, the 
impact of Covid-19 and the psychological effect of US 
sanctions, it reached a record high of 3,200 pounds.63 
 
60 Between 2011 and 2015 alone, Syria’s exports shrank 
by 92 percent. World Bank, The Toll of War (see note 48), vii. 
61 According to the World Bank, production fell from 
about 368,000 barrels/day in 2010 to about 40,000 in 2016. 
World Bank, The Economics of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in 
MENA (see note 50), 27. Of these, only about 10,000 bar-
rels/day were produced in areas controlled by the regime. 
World Bank, The Toll of War (see note 48), vii. According to 
EIU in 2019 production was 25,000 barrels/day. EIU, Country 
Report Syria (see note 18), 8. According to SOHR in autumn 
2019 about one-third of Syrian territory and 70 percent of its 
oil and gas wells were controlled by the Syrian Democratic 
Forces (SDF). SOHR, “5 Years of International Coalition In-
volvement in Syria: One-third of the Country and 70% of Oil 
and Gas Are under Its Control, while Thousands of Victims 
and Violations Awaiting Investigation”, 2 October 2019, 
http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=142551 (accessed 29 January 
2020). 
62 World Bank, The Economics of Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
in MENA (see note 50), 29. 
63 See also Two Countries, One Crisis: The Impact of Lebanon’s 
Upheaval on Syria, COAR, Thematic Report (21 December 
2019), https://coar-global.org/2019/12/21/two-countries-one-
crisis-the-impact-of-lebanons-upheaval-on-syria/ (accessed 
The most noticeable consequence for ordinary citi-
zens in Syria has been a significant increase in the cost 
of living.64 In combination with a massive rise in un-
employment, they have become increasingly depend-
ent on international aid and remittances.65 In June 
2020, the head of the WFP warned of famine;66 ac-
cording to its figures, 9.3 million Syrians were experi-
encing food insecurity (up from 6.5 million 2018), a 
further 2.2 million were at risk of food insecurity; 
more than 80,000 children were chronically malnour-
ished.67 
Damascus lacks the resources to 
pursue economic reconstruction or 
invest in infrastructure. 
The government’s budget for 2020 proposes a 
slight overall increase in spending, by 3 percent to 
US$9.8 billion, partly to fund higher public sector 
salaries and pensions. The only planned spending 
cuts are a reduction in subsidies, including those on 
fuel. As a result the fiscal situation is likely to remain 
tight. It is also dubious whether the spending can 
 
10 March 2020); Cash Crash: Syria’s Economic Collapse and the 
Fragmentation of the State, COAR, Thematic Report (6 July 
2020), https://coar-global.org/2020/07/06/cash-crash-syrias-
economic-collapse-and-the-fragmentation-of-the-state/ 
(accessed 10 July 2020). 
64 Ben Parker, “Briefing: What to Watch in Syria This 
Year”, New Humanitarian, 8 January 2020, https://www. 
thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2020/1/8/Syria-aid-recon 
struction-refugees-peace-conflict-Idlib-UN-NGOs-Turkey-
Russia (accessed 29 January 2020); World Food Programme 
(WFP), Market Price Watch Bulletin (Syria Country Office, 
November 2019), https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-
0000111576/download/?iframe (accessed 29 January 2020). 
65 The World Bank estimates that in 2018 the remittances 
from more than nine million Syrians living abroad amounted 
to about US$1.6 billion; see EIU, Country Report Syria (see 
note 18), 6. EIU cites an official unemployment rate of 43.5 
percent in 2019; ibid., 10. The value of remittances has col-
lapsed though in the wake of measures adopted by the gov-
ernment during the Covid-19 pandemic.  
66 Damien McElroy, “Stark Warning of Syrian Famine 
from UN Food Programme Chief”, The National, 12 June 2020, 
https://www.thenational.ae/uae/stark-warning-of-dangers-of-
syrian-famine-from-un-food-programme-chief-1.1032650 
(accessed 10 July 2020). 
67 WFP, WFP Syria Country Brief (June 2020), https://docs.wfp. 
org/api/documents/WFP-0000117465/download/?_ga= 
2.77749910.385596067.1594389871-685302436.1594389871 
(accessed 10 July 2020). 
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actually be covered by further borrowing and/or 
higher revenues resulting from the recapture of terri-
tory and the restoration of control over border cross-
ings.68 Damascus definitely does not possess the 
resources to expand its investment in infrastructure 
or pursue economic reconstruction. 
Sanctions 
A complex and extensive sanctions regime has played 
a decisive role in Syria’s economic decline. Since 2011 
sanctions have been imposed by the United States, 
the European Union, the Arab League and Turkey.69 
Although the UN itself has not imposed sanctions and 
certain Arab states (such as Iraq) and Turkey have 
not enforced theirs strictly, restrictions on trade and 
finance, travel bans and asset freezes have had far-
reaching consequences, both intended and unintended. 
They target representatives of the regime, state insti-
tutions (in particular the central bank and the oil 
sector), as well as individuals accused of responsibility 
for grave human rights violations. But they also affect 
independent entrepreneurs, humanitarian aid and 
the supply of basic necessities for the population.70 
 
68 EIU, Country Report Syria (see note 18), 6. 
69 On US sanctions, see U.S. State Department, Syria Sanc-
tions, https://www.state.gov/syria-sanctions/ (accessed 29 Janu-
ary 2020); for a list of individuals and entities subject to 
sanctions, see U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Sanctions 
List Search, https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/ (accessed 
29 January 2020); for EU sanctions, see EU Sanctions Map, 
Restrictive Measures against Syria, https://sanctionsmap.eu/#/ 
main/details/32,34/?search=%7B%22value%22:%22%22,%22 
searchType%22:%7B%7D%7D; for Arab League sanctions, see 
“Syria Unrest: Arab League Adopts Sanctions in Cairo”, BBC, 
27 November 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-
east-15901360 (accessed 29 January 2020); “Nas al-‘uqubat 
alatti faradatha al-Jam‘a al- ‘Arabiya ‘ala Suriya” [Text of 
the sanctions imposed on Syria by the Arab League], Reuters, 
27 November 2011, https://ara.reuters.com/article/idARACAE 
7AQ0E420111127 (accessed 29 January 2020). There are also 
counter-terrorism sanctions imposed by the United Nations, 
United States, European Union and others, which are directed 
primarily against IS and Al-Qaeda. 
70 On the effects of financial and import sanctions in par-
ticular on humanitarian aid and reconstruction, see Alice 
Debarre, Making Sanctions Smarter: Safeguarding Humanitarian 
Action (New York: International Peace Institute, December 
2019), 8–13, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2019/12/1912_Making-Sanctions-Smarter.pdf (accessed 
29 January 2020). 
The comprehensive sanctions against Syria’s rulers, 
businesspeople and institutions cannot to date be said 
to have led to any change in behaviour, political con-
cessions or ending of human rights violations. But 
research does indicate that the measures have con-
tributed significantly to Syria’s economic contraction, 
although it is difficult to isolate the impact of sanc-
tions from other factors (in particular war damage, 
flight and forced displacement). It is incontrovertible, 
however, that they hamper remittances and food im-
ports, increase production costs and negatively affect 
the production of medical goods. As such, it must be 
assumed that they contribute to increasing unem-
ployment, reducing wages and salaries, and increas-
ing the cost of living.71 The tightening of US sanctions 
on Iran has also had knock-on effects in the form of 
fuel shortages and price inflation in Syria. The com-
prehensive secondary sanctions adopted by the US 
Congress in December 2019 aim in particular at pre-
venting reconstruction.72 
The Consequences of Death and 
Displacement 
Observers assume that more than half a million 
people have been killed in the course of the fighting 
in Syria and hundreds of thousands more injured.73 
The biggest humanitarian emergency of our time is 
playing out in and around Syria.74 More than half 
 
71 Erica S. Moret, “Humanitarian Impacts of Economic 
Sanctions on Iran and Syria”, European Security 24, no. 1 
(2015): 10ff.; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures 
on the Enjoyment of Human Rights on His Mission to the Syrian 
Arab Republic (11 September 2018), https://reliefweb.int/sites/ 
reliefweb.int/files/resources/A_HRC_39_54_Add.pdf (accessed 
27 March 2020). 
72 US Congress, “Title LXXIV – Caesar Syria Civilian Pro-
tection Act of 2019” (see note 43). 
73 There are no independent sources; the UN stopped 
counting deaths in early 2014. Apart from those killed 
during fighting, it is estimated that around 100,000 Syrians 
have been tortured to death in government and IS prisons. 
For a detailed account, see SOHR, “About Nine Years of the 
Syrian War: Continuous Killing and Destruction while War 
Criminals Go Unpunished”, 10 January 2020, http://www. 
syriahr.com/en/?p=152653 (accessed 26 February 2020). 
74 Syrians represented the world’s second-largest refugee 
population, according to then UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees António Guterres in 2014; quoted in UNHCR, 
“Needs Soar as Number of Syrian Refugees Tops 3 Million”, 
 The Consequences of Death and Displacement 
 SWP Berlin 
 Reconstruction in Syria 
 July 2020 
 21 
Syria’s population felt compelled to leave their 
homes, with the immediate reasons including grave 
human rights violations by the regime, IS and rebel 
groups, fighting and destruction, and the collapse 
of infrastructure. At the beginning of 2020 about 5.6 
million Syrian refugees and 6.1 million IDPs were 
registered with the UNHCR.75 Many of the IDPs have 
had to flee multiple times in the course of the war, 
or have been repeatedly deported or resettled. New 
waves of displacement occurred at the beginning of 
2020, above all in the contested province of Idlib.76 A 
large part of the population has lost their livelihood 
through (forced) displacement, destruction, looting 
and economic collapse. At the beginning of 2020 
about 11 million Syrians – two-thirds of the remain-
ing population – were dependent on humanitarian 
aid.77 
Social and Human Capital 
The conflict has had an enormous impact on Syrian 
social and human capital. Ethnic and confessional 
mobilisation and war crimes have left the social con-
tract between political leadership and population 
fractured and the coexistence of diverse ethnic and 
religious groups deeply harmed. Human development 
has also suffered. While Syria was in the middle cat-
egory of the UN Human Development Index (HDI) in 
2010, with a two-decade positive trend, it is now in 
the bottom category.78 
 
29 August 2014, https://www.unhcr.org/53ff76c99.html 
(accessed 28 January 2020). 
75 Most of the refugees are in the neighbouring states of 
Turkey (about 3.6 million), Lebanon (about 900,000), Jordan 
(about 650,000), Iraq (about 250,000) and Egypt (about 
130,000). UNHCR, “Operational Portal – Refugee Situation”, 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria_durable_solutions 
(accessed 28 January 2020). 
76 UN OCHA, Syrian Arab Republic – Recent Developments in 
Northwest Syria, Situation Report 7 (29 January 2020), https:// 
reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-
recent-developments-northwestern-syria-situation-13 (ac-
cessed 26 February 2020). See also Sinem Adar, Steffen Ange-
nendt, Muriel Asseburg, Raphael Bossong and David Kipp, 
The Refugee Drama in Syria, Turkey, and Greece: Why a Comprehen-
sive Approach Is Needed, SWP Comment 16/2020 (Berlin: Stif-
tung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2020), https://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/publication/the-refugee-drama-in-syria-turkey-
and-greece/ (accessed 26 March 2020). 
77 UNHCR, “Operational Portal” (see note 75). 
78 Since 2013 alone Syria has fallen fourteen places, see 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “Human 
The Syrian health system is 
very poorly prepared for the 
Covid-19 pandemic. 
The conflict has particularly grave long-term 
effects in the education and health sectors. The dra-
matic loss of teachers through flight and forced dis-
placement leaves a “lost generation” growing up in 
Syria. UNICEF estimates that about half of Syria’s 
children (in Syria and neighbouring countries) are not 
going to school, often because their school building 
has suffered serious damage or is being used as a 
shelter for IDPs. The Syrian health system is now also 
completely dysfunctional. Many health care facilities 
have been destroyed, there are shortages of equip-
ment and medicines, the majority of health care pro-
fessionals have left the country. One consequence of 
this has been a dramatic decline in immunisation 
rates and increases in disease, epidemics and infant 
mortality.79 Consequently Syria was also very poorly 
prepared for dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic.80 
Limited Returns 
Although large parts of the country are no longer 
embattled and living conditions for refugees in neigh-
bouring states have deteriorated noticeably in recent 
years, the number of returnees has remained com-
paratively small. The UN still does not see the condi-
tions in place for safe, voluntary and permanent 
return of displaced persons. One reason for this is 
 
Development Report 2019”, 304, http://hdr.undp.org/en/ 
content/table-2-human-development-index-trends-1990–
2018 (accessed 28 January 2020); UNDP, “Syrian Arab Repub-
lic – Human Development Indicators”, http://hdr.undp.org/ 
en/countries/profiles/SYR (accessed 28 January 2020). 
79 World Bank, The Economics of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in 
MENA (see note 50), 17–29. 
80 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Briefing Secu-
rity Council, Emergency Relief Coordinator Warns of Poten-
tially Devastating Consequences for Syrians Most Vulnerable 
to COVID-19, 31 March 2020, https://www.un.org/press/en/ 
2020/sc14148.doc.htm (accessed 10 April 2020). Conflict 
dynamics have impeded action to deal effectively with the 
pandemic, see Muriel Asseburg, Hamidreza Azizi, Galip 
Dalai, Moritz Pieper, The Covid-19 Pandemic and Conflict 
Dynamics in Syria: Neither a Turning Point Nor an Overall Deter-
minant, SWP Comment 21/2020 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, May 2020, https://www.swp-berlin.org/ 
fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2020C21_Covid 
Syria.pdf. 
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that the UNHCR still does not have unhindered access 
to returnees to ensure their security and for service 
provision. For that reason, the UN and international 
organisations like the IOM are not actively supporting 
return.81 In the course of 2019, according to UN fig-
ures, 87,000 refugees returned to Syria, for the period 
2016–2019 the figure was 220,000; in both cases 
overwhelmingly from Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon.82 
Surveys conducted by UNHCR in 2018 show that 
the main reasons for Syrian refugees not to return are 
fear of political persecution, lawlessness and forced 
conscription, and feeling unsafe or being unable to 
reclaim property because of missing documentation. 
An August 2019 report by the Syrian Network for 
Human Rights (SNHR) demonstrates that these con-
cerns over personal safety are anything but ground-
less. It documents almost two thousand cases where 
returnees were arbitrarily detained. Almost one-third 
disappeared; fifteen are known to have died under 
torture. Many of those who were released were, ac-
cording to SNHR, later detained again or conscripted.83 
Moreover many refugees assume that they would not 
find adequate livelihoods if they returned, because 
of destruction of housing, looting, and legislation 
designed to enable expropriations and property sei-
zures especially from displaced persons. Refugees also 
expect that access to basic services will be heavily 
restricted, especially in (formerly) embattled areas.84 
 
81 “United Nations Seeks Negotiated Political Solution as 
Syria Conflict Enters Ninth Year, Under-Secretary-General 
Tells Security Council”, United Nations press release, 
SC/13751, 27 March 2019, https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ 
sc13751.doc.htm (accessed 29 January 2020). This assessment 
is shared by the German government. See Chancellor Angela 
Merkel at a press conference with Turkish President Tayyip 
Erdoğan on 24 January 2020 in Istanbul, “Video – Merkel 
stellt der Türkei weitere finanziellen Hilfen in Aussicht”, 
Tagesschau.de, 24 January 2020, https://www.tagesschau.de/ 
multimedia/video/video-651383.html (accessed 29 January 
2020). See also Muriel Asseburg, Perspektiven für Flüchtlinge 
statt Anreize zur Rückkehr nach Syrien, SWP Kurz gesagt (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik website, 29 April 2019), 
http://bit.ly/SWP19KG0429 (accessed 10 March 2020). 
82 UNHCR, “Operational Portal” (see note 75). It must, 
however, be assumed that the actual figure is higher and 
that not all of those who returned did so voluntarily. 
83 SNHR, “The Syrian Regime Continues to Pose a Violent 
Barbaric Threat and Syrian Refugees Should Never Return to 
Syria”, 15 April 2019, http://sn4hr.org/blog/2019/08/15/54146/ 
(accessed 29 January 2020). 
84 World Bank, The Mobility of Displaced Syrians: An Economic 
and Social Analysis (Washington, D.C., 6 February 2019), 16–20, 
Interim Conclusion 
Under current conditions economic recovery in Syria 
in a form that would create jobs, provide adequate 
incomes, and stimulate food production for local mar-
kets will be almost impossible. Nor is the state itself 
likely to succeed in increasing its revenues in the 
medium term and resuming the provision of basic 
services to the population, even if Damascus wanted 
to do so. The main obstacles are the sanctions, includ-
ing the tightening of American secondary sanctions, 
and the traditional dysfunctional politico-economic 
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The EU and its member states have made engagement 
in reconstruction in Syria conditional on a political 
transition as laid out in UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 2254 (2015) or at least viable steps towards an 
inclusive conflict resolution and a political opening.85 
Correspondingly, European engagement on the 
ground has remained largely restricted to humani-
tarian aid. At the same time the EU has imposed 
comprehensive sanctions on Syrian institutions and 
individuals. But recent years have seen an incremen-
tal erosion of the EU’s united front on Syria. A debate 
about European interests and entry points for more 
effective engagement has not yet been held, not least 
out of fear that the member states’ positions could 
diverge even further. 
European Positions and Instruments 
Under the conditional approach of the April 2017 
Syria strategy, the EU and its member states pursue 
the following objectives: to end the war through an 
inclusive political transition; to address the humani-
tarian needs of especially vulnerable groups; to sup-
port democracy, human rights and freedom of expres-
sion; to promote accountability for war crimes; and 
to enhance the resilience of the Syrian population.86 
 
85 UN Security Council, Resolution 2254 – Middle East (Syria), 
S/RES/2254 (2015), 18 December 2015, http://unscr.com/en/ 
resolutions/2254 (accessed 6 March 2020); European External 
Action Service (EEAS), “Syria: Speech by HR/VP Josep Borrell 
in the EP on the Current Security Situation in Syria”, 12 Feb-
ruary 2020, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage/74537/syria-speech-hrvp-josep-borrell-ep-current-
security-situation-syria_en (accessed 6 March 2020). 
86 Council of the European Union, “Council Adopts EU 
Strategy on Syria”, press release, 3 April 2017, https://www. 
Brussels continues to assume that a lasting stabilisa-
tion will be impossible under the leadership of Bashar 
al-Assad. In the same vein, Assad is not regarded as a 
cooperation partner, also in connection with accusa-
tions of war crimes and the use of internationally 
banned weapons. European support for a reconstruc-
tion under Assad, in this perspective, would only con-
tribute to shoring up a repressive regime, cementing 
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Apart from engagement in the anti-IS coalition,88 
Europe’s main concrete contribution is humanitarian 
aid. Taken together, the EU and its member states are 
by far the largest donor in this area. Between 2011 
and late autumn 2019 they provided more than €17 
billion in humanitarian aid for Syrians in the coun-
try itself and in neighbouring states.89 Germany is 
the second largest bilateral donor after the United 
States.90 According to the German UN ambassador 
Christoph Heusgen, Germany has contributed more 
than €8 billion in humanitarian aid to Syria since 
2012.91 In almost all cases the assistance is imple-
mented on the ground by UN agencies and inter-
national non-governmental organisations (INGOs). 
In principle, this aid is restricted to emergency relief 
for the population, refugees and IDPs. Further-reach-
ing measures dubbed “humanitarian plus” or “early 
recovery” are only supported to a very small extent 
by a handful of member states.92 For a time additional 
funding (so-called stabilisation assistance) was chan-
nelled to areas controlled by the opposition, and to a 
lesser extent by the Kurds, to strengthen local politi-
cal structures. To a limited extent the EU and its 
member states also support small rehabilitation and 
development projects run by INGOs and Syrian civil 
society organisations. 
 
88 See Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on 
the EU Regional Strategy for Syria and Iraq as Well as the Da’esh 
Threat, 23 May 2016, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/ 
document/ST-9105-2016-INIT/en/pdf (accessed 6 March 2020). 
89 Council of the European Union, “Overview – Syria: 
Council Response to the Crisis”, 10 February 2020, https:// 
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/syria/ (accessed 6 
March 2020). The United States has been the largest single 
donor to the humanitarian response in Syria and Syrians 
displaced in the region, providing over US$10.6 billion in 
humanitarian assistance. U.S. Department of State, Near East 
Bureau, “U.S. Relations with Syria: Bilateral Relations Fact 
Sheet”, 6 May 2020, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-
syria/ (accessed 11 July 2020). 
90 In 2019 alone, Germany supplied more than €300 mil-
lion in humanitarian aid. Auswärtiges Amt, “Humanitäre 
Hilfe in Syrien”, 4 February 2020, https://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/laender/syrien-node/humanitaere-
hilfe-syrien/2303004?isLocal=false&isPreview=false (accessed 
9 March 2020). 
91 German Mission to United Nations, Twitter, 5 March 
2020, https://twitter.com/GermanyUN/status/123561981456 
0980993?s=20 (accessed 9 March 2020). 
92 Discussions between the author and European diplo-
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Since 2011 Europe has imposed comprehensive 
sanctions against the Syrian state and against Syrian 
individuals and entities. These measures have been 
regularly updated and extended annually by decision 
of the member states.93 The sanctions firstly target 
individuals who are responsible for violent repression 
of the population and use of internationally banned 
weapons, whose activities directly benefit the Assad 
regime, or who profit from transactions that violate 
housing, land and property rights (HLP rights); in-
dividuals and firms associated with them are also 
targeted. The circles affected by sanctions include 
leading entrepreneurs, members of the Assad and 
Makhluf families, ministers, high-ranking members 
of the armed forces and intelligence services, mem-
bers of pro-government militias, and individuals 
associated with the production, dissemination and 
use of chemical weapons. Europe has imposed travel 
bans and/or asset freezes on 273 individuals and 70 
entities (as of May 2020).94 
All EU member states 
support continuing sanctions – 
but unity is eroding. 
The purpose of sanctions is secondly to restrict 
the regime’s financing opportunities and repressive 
capacities and to isolate it internationally. To that 
end Europe has instituted an arms embargo against 
Damascus and placed export restrictions on equip-
ment that can be used for internal repression. It has 
also imposed an oil embargo, frozen assets of the 
Syrian central bank in the EU, and curtailed Syria’s 
finance and banking sector’s dealings with Europe, 
which makes trade with the country difficult. Exports 
of military and dual-use goods to Syria are prohibited. 
The sanctions package also includes far-reaching 
sectoral measures that hinder reconstruction. This 
applies in particular to restrictions on funding for oil 
 
93 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision 
2011/273/CFSP of 9 May 2011 Concerning Restrictive Meas-
ures against Syria”, Official Journal of the European Union, 10 
May 2011 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? 
uri=OJ:L:2011:121:0011:0014:EN:PDF (accessed 6 March 2020). 
The EU also implements UN sanctions against Al-Qaeda and 
IS. 
94 Council of the European Union, “Syria: Sanctions against 
the Regime Extended by One Year”, press statement, 28 May 
2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/ 
2020/05/28/syria-sanctions-against-the-regime-extended-by-one-
year/ (accessed 11 July 2020). 
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and electricity infrastructure projects; the ban on 
European Investment Bank (EIB) funding for projects 
that would benefit the Syrian state; and restrictions 
on cooperation in banking and transport, for example 
in the case of the Syrian airline.95 
Growing Divergence 
To date all EU member states have regularly voted to 
continue the sanctions. But cracks are appearing in 
the European stance. The background to this is the 
military gains made by the regime and its allies, con-
cern over the persistence of the refugee crisis (and the 
possibility of new refugee movements), and Russia’s 
overtures for European support for reconstruction 
as well as business interests of some European com-
panies. 
Germany, France and the United Kingdom are the 
most insistent on adhering to the existing position.96 
Other European states have either never broken off 
diplomatic relations (Czech Republic) or only down-
graded them (Bulgaria), resumed relations with rele-
vant top figures in the regime (Italy, Poland) or 
publicly and ostentatiously discussed reopening their 
embassy and expanding economic engagement 
 
95 Council of the European Union, “Council Regulation 
(EU) No. 36/2012 of 18 January 2012 Concerning Restrictive 
Measures in View of the Situation in Syria and Repealing 
Regulation (EU) No 442/2011”, Official Journal of the European 
Union, Document 02012R0036, 27 September 2017, https:// 
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1512995969 
284&uri=CELEX:02012R0036-20170927 (accessed 6 March 
2020); Council of the European Union, “Council Decision 
2013/255/CFSP of 31 May 2013 Concerning Restrictive 
Measures against Syria”, Official Journal of the European Union, 
Document 02013D0255, 27 September 2017, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?qid=1521627773811& 
uri=CELEX%3A02013D0255-20170927 (accessed 6 March 
2020). 
96 Auswärtiges Amt, Joint Statement on the Ninth Anniversary 
of the Syrian Uprising by the Governments of Germany, France, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, 15 March 2020, https:// 
www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/ninth-
anniversary-syrian-uprising/2319040. It includes the state-
ment: “Yet, we will not consider providing or supporting any 
reconstruction assistance until a credible, substantive, and 
genuine political process is irreversibly underway. Absent 
such a process, reconstruction assistance for Syria would 
only entrench a deeply flawed and abusive government, in-
crease corruption, reinforce the war economy and further 
aggravate the root causes of the conflict.” 
(Austria, Hungary, Italy, Poland).97 While such steps 
have not to date been realised, sanctions have repeat-
edly been undermined by member states. 
 
97 On the respective EU member states’ relations with Syria, 
see International Crisis Group (ICG), Ways out of Europe’s Syria 
Reconstruction Conundrum, Middle East Report 209 (Brussels, 
25 November 2019), 22f., https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront. 
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Reconstruction in Syria touches above all on three 
European interests. Firstly Europe has an interest in 
a lasting stabilisation where Syria is no longer the 
source of conflicts, refugee movements and terrorism. 
Secondly it serves Europe’s interests if refugees and 
IDPs are enabled to return voluntarily under safe and 
dignified conditions. Thirdly it is in Europe’s interest 
to see prosecutions for human rights violations, war 
crimes and the use of internationally banned weap-
ons, to deter future perpetrators, lay the groundwork 
for reconciliation in Syria and prevent further erosion 
of the rules-based international order. 
To date however Europe has been able to bring 
little influence to bear on the conflict dynamics on 
the ground, on a negotiated peace settlement or 
on the actions of the regime; nor has it been able to 
establish legal accountability for the crimes commit-
ted in Syria. One reason for this is that European 
states possess no relevant military presence and have 
largely refrained from throwing their political weight 
onto the international scales. Another is that the 
instruments available to them – above all condition-
ality of EU reconstruction assistance, recognition and 
the sanctions regime – hardly affect the regime’s 
cost-benefit analysis, not least because conflict dy-
namics have changed fundamentally since the Rus-
sian military intervention. While the military 
successes of the regime and its backers have averted 
a political transition, Europe is still chasing regime 
change – or offering European engagement in a 
“day after” scenario. It certainly excludes cooperation 
not only with the top regime leaders, but also with 
representatives of state institutions. Yet, given the 
actual military and political conflict dynamics, a sce-
nario of inclusive transition will remain unrealistic 
for the foreseeable future. Europe has not to date 
adequately thought through how its interests, as laid 
out above, can be pursued under the assumption that 
the Assad regime survives. One thing is clear: If the 
EU member states break ranks towards Damascus 
they risk losing even the little influence they might 
have had. Only if the funding of reconstruction, the 
resumption of diplomatic relations and sanctions 
relief are advanced collectively and deliberately can 
they generate positive political momentum.98 
A More Realistic European Approach 
It would therefore make sense to adjust the European 
approach to better correspond to current realities, 
bring European interests and instruments into line, 
and make the most effective possible use of the little 
influence that Europe can have.99 The precondition 
for this would be firstly to admit that Europe will 
not achieve through incentives and sanctions what 
Damascus and its allies have crushed by military 
means: a conflict settlement negotiated between the 
Syrian conflict parties, a political opening leading to 
an inclusive and participatory political system and 
 
98 Roderich Kiesewetter, “Wiederaufbau jetzt? Die Rolle 
Deutschlands und Europas”, Die politische Meinung – Zeitschrift 
für Politik, Gesellschaft, Religion und Kultur, no. 553 (4 Decem-
ber 2018): 18f., https://www.kas.de/de/web/die-politische-
meinung/artikel/detail/-/content/wiederaufbau-jetzt- (accessed 
10 March 2020); Eugenio Dacrema and Valerie Talbot, eds., 
Rebuilding Syria: The Middle East’s Next Power Game (Milan: Isti-
tuto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale [ISPI], September 
2019, esp. 137–43, https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/ 
files/pubblicazioni/ispi_report_rebuilding_syria_2019.pdf 
(accessed 27 March 2020). 
99 For alternative suggestions see also Julien Barnes-Dacey, 
Society Max: How Europe Can Help Syrians Survive Assad and Coro-
navirus, ECFR, April 2020, https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/society_ 
max_how_europe_can_help_syrians_survive_assad_and_ 
coronavirus.pdf; Erwin van Veen, Hope Springs Eternal: 
EU Options for Dealing with the Assad Regime (The Hague: Clin-
gendael, March 2020), https://www.clingendael.org/sites/ 
default/files/2020-03/Policy_brief_EU_options_Assad_March_ 
2020_0.pdf (both accessed 11 July 2020). 
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the rule of law, and measures of transitional justice 
that would lay the basis for reconciliation between 
conflict parties and population groups. It includes, 
secondly, rejecting the illusion that Assad’s inner 
circle could be a reliable partner for stabilisation, eco-
nomic recovery and reconstruction, or for counter-
terrorism and return of refugees. Their prime concern 
is consolidating their grip on power. Everything else 
is subordinate to that, even at the expense of large 
parts of the population. That also means that com-
prehensive reconstruction – as an undertaking that 
involves much more than physical rebuilding, and 
where a return to the status quo ante is incompatible 
with lasting peace100 – cannot be achieved with the 
current leadership in Damascus.101 Thirdly, the cur-
rent economic and currency crisis and the erosion of 
state capacities in Syria should not be confused with 
an imminent collapse of the regime – still less in 
favour of an alternative force that would unify and 
stabilise the country. Instead the further erosion of 
state capacities is much more likely to be associated 
with renewed protest and fighting in so-called rec-
onciled areas as well as a reorganising of insurgency 
groups.102 Such a development also threatens desta-
bilisation spilling across Syria’s borders in the form 
of terrorism and renewed refugee movements. 
First and foremost, Europe should considerably 
step up diplomatic activity. It should push for crisis 
management and temporary arrangements that pri-
oritise protecting the civilian population (for example 
in the contested province of Idlib), and promote a 
negotiated peace settlement. In this context it would 
 
100 Aita, “Reconstruction as a Political-economy Issue” 
(see note 12); Faten Ghosn, “The Hard Road Ahead for Syria 
Reconstruction”, Current History (December 2018), http:// 
www.currenthistory.com/Article.php?ID=1533 (accessed 
6 March 2020). 
101 The World Bank points out that the pace of recon-
struction and future economic growth in Syria will depend 
in the first place on the manner in which the conflict ends, 
as this will be decisive for the volume of reconstruction assis-
tance, the numbers of returning refugees, and the strengthen-
ing of social capital in the sense of trust between different 
population groups. This assessment gives little grounds for 
optimism. See the growth forecasts for different conflict-
ending scenarios in Devadas, Elbadawi and Loayza, Growth 
after War in Syria (see note 46). 
102 See, for example, Abdullah Al-Jabassini, Festering Griev-
ances and the Return to Arms in Southern Syria (Florence: EUI, 
April 2020), https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/66786 (ac-
cessed 10 April 2020). 
also make sense to more closely coordinate the dif-
ferent multilateral processes – the Astana Process, 
the so-called Small Group and the Geneva Process – 
and seek synergies.103 A start was made in October 
2018 with a first meeting of the French, German, 
Russian and Turkish leaders, but this has not been 
followed up. 
As long as the current leadership retains its power 
in Syria, stronger European engagement is unlikely 
to achieve power-sharing or a political opening or a 
negotiated conflict settlement. And Europe rightly 
stresses that the countries responsible for stoking the 
conflict or for causing war damage bear a special 
obligation to finance the reconstruction. Nevertheless 
Europe should seek to contribute to alleviating suf-
fering and preventing a further deterioration of living 
conditions by improving the effectiveness of humani-
tarian aid, offering support for rehabilitation of basic 
infrastructure (even in areas controlled by Damascus 
as long as certain conditions apply) and lifting those 
sectoral sanctions that impede recovery and recon-
struction. Such an approach will necessitate coordi-
nation with the Syrian government at least at the 
technical level. The “price” will be that Damascus 
will interpret this as at least indirect recognition of 
its own legitimacy. 
But it is also clear that far-reaching reforms are pre-
conditional for lasting stabilisation. In this vein the 
EU should spell out its “more for more” approach,104 
laying out a future path of political opening and 
structural reforms in Syria on the one hand and Euro-
pean support for recovery and reconstruction and a 
normalisation of relations on the other. At the same 
time realpolitik should not mean neglecting core Euro-
pean interests, such as the prevention of war crimes 
and the preservation of a rules-based international 
order. Europe should refrain from normalising rela-
tions with the top leaders of the Assad regime and 
instead press for prosecutions for war crimes, grave 
 
103 Russia, Turkey and Iran coordinate in the Astana For-
mat; Egypt, Germany, France, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the 
United Kingdom and the United States consult in the Small 
Group. For the efforts of the UN Special Envoy in Geneva, 
see https://www.unog.ch/Syria. 
104 The then High Representative Federica Mogherini first 
formulated this approach in EEAS, Elements for an EU Strategy 
for Syria: Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council, JOIN (2017) 11 (Strasbourg, 14 March 2017), 15–18, 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/celex3a52017jc00113aen
3atxt.pdf (accessed 6 March 2020). 
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human rights violations and the use of internationally 
banned weapons. 
More specifically, the following measures should 
be considered. 
More Effective Assistance 
The humanitarian aid supplied by the EU and its 
member states via UN agencies and INGOs in Syria is 
to a large extent manipulated and politicised by the 
regime. Thus, rather than being dispensed according 
to international standards for humanitarian aid, it 
serves the interests of regime preservation. At the same 
time it is beyond doubt that Syrians will remain – 
and increasingly so – dependent on external support 
for the foreseeable future. It would therefore be 
crucial to undertake efforts to improve the effective-
ness of European aid. 
In that vein the EU has established a “Joint Pro-
gramme Mechanism” to ensure that six UN agencies 
registered in Damascus pursue a coordinated regional 
approach in their work. If other donors join it and 
a critical financial mass is achieved, this mechanism 
could gain greater weight in future negotiations with 
Damascus about access, visas and implementation 
modalities. This could offer a way to prevent Damas-
cus privileging or disadvantaging individual UN orga-
nisations according to their perceived usefulness or 
risk.105 In order to strengthen this approach, Europe 
should channel a greater share of its support via the 
mechanism and encourage other donors to partici-
pate in it. 
In addition, a strong audit mechanism involving 
donors and UN headquarters should establish inde-
pendent monitoring and evaluation ensuring pro-
fessional selection and vetting processes for local UN 
personnel and transparent procurement procedures 
which would guarantee that humanitarian organisa-
tions are able to freely choose their local implementa-
tion partners. This would allow them to reduce their 
dependency on local organisations and businesses that 
are directly or indirectly connected to the regime.106 
 
105 Discussions between the author and European and EU 
diplomats, Beirut, February 2020. 
106 For details see the recommendations in Haid, Principled 
Aid in Syria (see note 22), 5–10; Human Rights Watch, Rigg-
ing the System (see note 10). 
European Contribution to Rehabilitation 
of Basic Infrastructure 
The dilemma for Europe is that sustainable stabilisa-
tion in Syria can be achieved neither in cooperation 
with the current leadership in Damascus nor against 
it, i.e. by bypassing state structures. To date the focus 
of so-called stabilisation assistance has been on regions 
outside the regime’s control. As much as Syrians in 
these regions need support, supplying stabilisation 
assistance has become ever more difficult there. In-
dependent local structures capable of functioning as 
cooperation partners for rehabilitation and recovery 
have largely ceased to exist under the HTS-dominated 
“Salvation Government” in Idlib province and in 
the territories controlled by Turkey and its allies. 
They are unlikely to survive for long in the contested 
areas under the Kurdish-dominated self-administra-
tion in north-eastern Syria. And while more effective 
approaches for areas outside government control are 
urgently needed, they cannot address the challenges 
the majority of Syrians face. 
In regime-controlled areas Europe already supports 
local civil society initiatives realising small-scale reha-
bilitation projects – without having approval from 
Damascus but involving the relevant stakeholders and 
thus permitting a degree of local ownership.107 It 
should continue to do so. But this approach can only 
be expanded or reproduced to a limited extent with-
out endangering its local protagonists and/or the 
projects being appropriated by Damascus. And even 
if such an approach allows local priorities to be better 
identified and addressed by including relevant local 
actors, it will not be able to adequately meet the enor-
mous challenges of reconstruction. Also, with the 
September 2018 local elections, local political struc-
tures operating independently of Damascus have 
largely disappeared.108 Damascus has effectively 
 
107 Discussions between the author and representatives of 
the EU, international NGOs and Syrian NGOs implementing 
rehabilitation projects in Syria, Beirut, February 2020. 
108 The National Progressive Front, which is dominated 
by the Baath Party, stood about 70 percent of the candidates 
in the regime-controlled areas (often unopposed) and now 
dominates the local councils. The elections also served to 
provide local warlords with posts that allow them to exert 
decisive influence on local reconstruction priorities. For an 
analysis of the revival of the Baath Party and its mass organi-
sations, and the relevance of the elections for reconstruction, 
see Agnès Favier and Marie Kostrz, Local Elections: Is Syria Mov-
ing to Reassert Central Control? (Florence: EUI, February 2019), 
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blocked a decentralisation that would permit autono-
mous local units or any counterweight to the centre.109 
It would therefore make sense to move rapidly 
to a form of assistance that places considerably more 
emphasis on rehabilitation of basic infrastructure 
and improves living conditions through employment 
programmes and local procurement.110 Europe’s self-
imposed restriction to emergency assistance stands 
in the way of effective support for the population. 
Ultimately it risks contributing to cementing a situa-
tion in which living conditions deteriorate and the 
population remains permanently dependent on inter-
national aid and on the benevolence of the regime. 
This applies in particular to cities, neighbourhoods 
and rural areas that were controlled by the opposition 
and suffered massive destruction during their recap-
ture. Europe should make decisions about mine clear-
ance, housing (re)construction, restoration of basic 
infrastructure (water and sewerage, power, health, 
education), and local programmes for securing liveli-
hoods exclusively on the basis of the needs of the po-
pulation and not on the political stance of the regime. 
The decisive criterion for any European engagement 
in such rehabilitation projects should therefore be 
whether such projects can be realised without violat-
ing property rights or disadvantaging population 
groups on the basis of (insinuated) political loyalties. 
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109 “President al-Assad: The War Was between Us Syrians 
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Other”, SANA, 17 February 2019, https://www.sana.sy/en/ 
?p=158819 (accessed 12 April 2020). 
110 Some EU member states already support projects in the 
area of rehabilitation of basic infrastructure. But to date this 
only accounts for a small proportion of overall assistance; 
ICG, Ways out of Europe’s Syria Reconstruction Conundrum (see 
note 97), 24. Discussions between the author and European 
diplomats, Beirut, February 2020. For the idea see also 
Volker Perthes, Syria: Too Fragile to Ignore: Military Outcomes, 
External Influence and European Options, SWP Comment 7/2019 
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2019), 
https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019C07/ (accessed 10 
March 2020). 
Testing Damascus with an Offer 
One way to test whether such a form of engagement 
is actually possible would be for Europe to make an 
offer for a large-scale rehabilitation project that is 
so attractive that it would be difficult for Damascus 
to publicly reject it.111 Instead of scattering support 
across a multitude of UN agencies and INGOs, Europe 
could bundle part of its aid in an exemplary offer, 
for example to restore the basic infrastructure in one 
of the most heavily damaged cities, and thus create a 
precedent.112 The project would not be conditional 
on the regime changing its behaviour on the political 
level. But Damascus would have to agree to the sup-
port being aligned on the needs of the population. In 
concrete terms that would mean that no population 
group would be excluded, currently separated quar-
ters would be reconnected, HLP rights would be safe-
guarded; the project would be based on independent 
needs analyses and identification of priorities, with 
the participation of the local population; implement-
ing partners would be chosen by Europe without 
interference; and independent monitoring would be 
allowed. Europe should build into such a proposal a 
system of indicators and benchmarks to ensure that 
implementation is stopped immediately if these prin-
ciples are undermined by Damascus. 
Reviewing the Sanctions Regime 
It would certainly also make sense to review the exist-
ing sanctions regime as Europe’s punitive measures 
play a role (albeit a minor one) in preventing reha-
bilitation, the creation of livelihoods and economic 
recovery. The most pressing aspect is to clarify the con-
ditions for humanitarian exemptions and to avoid 
overcompliance with regulations, for example by 
banks. Particular scrutiny should also be applied to 
reviewing those sectoral sanctions (for example with 
regard to the electricity sector and EIB involvement), 
which stand in the way of rehabilitation of basic 
infrastructure, business activity of independent 
Syrian entrepreneurs and improvements in living 
conditions. In order to avoid any impression that 
 
111 The idea was developed in discussion with Maxwell 
Gardiner, COAR, Beirut, February 2020. 
112 COAR’s “Needs Oriented Strategic Area Profiles” of in-
dividual regions could be helpful for such planning. They 
can be found at: https://coar-global.org/nosap/. 
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sanctions relief represents a political concession to 
Damascus, sanctions against top regime figures and 
individuals accused of grave crimes and/or violation 
of HLP rights could be further tightened at the same 
time. 
If the respective sectoral European sanctions were 
lifted, this would remove at least one important 
obstacle inhibiting rehabilitation (for example in the 
electricity sector) and a further deterioration of living 
conditions. But Europe should have no illusions. 
Apart from Europe’s punitive measures, Syria’s own 
politico-economic structures and US sanctions also 
obstruct economic recovery and reconstruction. The 
comprehensive sanctions package adopted by the US 
Congress in December 2019 and in effect since June 
2020 (so-called Caesar sanctions), with its direct and 
secondary sanctions, makes international engagement 
in Syria’s reconstruction extremely unattractive. If 
Europeans are interested in engaging in rehabilita-
tion activities, they will have to seek humanitarian 
waivers under the Caesar sanctions. 
Supporting Refugees and IDPs 
There is little Europe can currently do to facilitate the 
return of refugees and IDPs. The conditions for vol-
untary, safe and dignified return do not yet exist and 
cannot be expected to improve quickly. There is no 
sign of the required change of stance in Damascus 
nor of the required progress on reconstruction. Even 
if public services in the country were to function 
again, according to simulations published by the 
World Bank, many Syrians would only consider 
returning if they felt their personal safety was also 
ensured. And even if the conditions for safe return 
were to exist, the models indicate a negative corre-
lation between rapid return of refugees and standard 
of living. The World Bank therefore advises against 
international efforts to promote early return.113 
In the eventuality of the regime showing genuine 
willingness to permit refugees to return, Europe 
should offer its support. That should include creating 
the necessary preconditions, such as establishing a 
clear legal framework, procedures and mechanisms 
to permit orderly restitution of and/or compensation 
for land, housing and commercial property. 
 
113 World Bank, The Mobility of Displaced Syrians (see note 84), 
23–26. 
But in the medium term Europe should concen-
trate above all on support for the displaced: through 
UNHCR and UNRWA for IDPs, through UN agencies, 
INGOs and Syria’s neighbours for refugees outside the 
country. Especially in relation to neighbouring states 
it is crucial to expand financial support and intensify 
the dialogue in order to avoid a worsening of con-
ditions on the ground and refugees being deported 
into a situation of uncertainty. 
But merely feeding and housing refugees is not 
enough. In fact the Syrian diaspora offers Europe an 
opportunity to tackle one of the country’s biggest 
challenges, namely, to strengthen the human capital 
available to Syria when the political circumstances 
finally permit returns. Europe should therefore put 
greater effort and investment into training Syrian 
teachers, doctors, nurses, administrators, engineers 
and other skilled workers in the main host countries 
(in the region and in Europe). 
The “More for More” Approach 
Above and beyond current policy options it would be 
extremely useful to clarify how and under what con-
ditions Europe would be ready to engage in reconstruc-
tion and what a path to normalisation in relations 
with Damascus might look like. In 2017 the then EU 
High Representative Federica Mogherini published 
a “more for more” approach that made European 
concessions dependent on changes in the regime’s 
behaviour. This approach has to date not been fleshed 
out and actively brought into play vis-a-vis Damas-
cus.114 To date the EU offers engagement in recon-
struction only if a political transition as per Security 
Council Resolution 2254 is firmly under way. In this 
case, in return for concrete measurable progress, 
Europe would make concrete offers, such as easing 
sanctions; resuming cooperation with the Syrian gov-
ernment, for example in the frame of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP); mobilising finance for 
reconstruction together with the IMF and World Bank; 
in the sphere of security; with regard to governance, 
reforms and services; concerning social cohesion, 
peacebuilding and reconciliation; and strengthening 
human capital and supporting economic recovery. 
But Brussels has yet to spell out in detail how Damas-
cus would have to alter its behaviour concretely 
(below the threshold of regime change or substantial 
 
114 EAD, Elements for an EU Strategy for Syria (see note 104). 
 No Blind Eye to Grave Human Rights Violations 
 SWP Berlin 
 Reconstruction in Syria 
 July 2020 
 31 
regime transformation) and how the European side 
would respond to which reform step.115 
The leadership in Damascus cannot at the current 
juncture be realistically expected to regard a fleshed 
out “more for more” as an offer it needs to concern 
itself with. So it is unlikely that operationalisation 
under current circumstances would bring about any 
change in behaviour. Nevertheless it remains impera-
tive that the European states agree a shared line on 
which behaviour of the Syrian leadership their con-
cessions should depend on. It should also be made 
clear to Damascus that the EU and its member states 
are sticking to the perspective that a lasting stabilisa-
tion presupposes fundamental reforms. And it is 
worthwhile laying out how a path of rapprochement 
might look, because it is by no means excluded that 
a new leadership in Damascus would develop an 
interest in closer relations and/or that Moscow might 
be prepared to support elements thereof. Precisely 
this point should be explored in a dialogue with 
Russian partners.116 
It would therefore be helpful to take a differentiated 
look at the European offers discussed above and sys-
tematically review what can already be done and 
what should be conditional on the behaviour of the 
leadership. As explained above, measures orientated 
on the basic needs of the population should not be 
subject to political conditionality. The most impor-
tant consideration here is to ensure that European 
aid is not diverted and politicised. But any rapproche-
ment with Damascus and engagement in reconstruc-
 
115 ICG, Ways out of Europe’s Syria Reconstruction Conundrum 
(see note 97), 28ff., offers a helpful operationalisation of a 
“more for more” approach, showing in detail the kind of 
parallel steps the two sides could take. The approach pro-
posed here is different, in the first place in the sense that 
political conditionality is lifted for European measures 
directed at satisfying the basic needs of the population. 
116 To date such efforts appear to have been fruitless. For 
a joint approach with Russia or a division of labour, see also 
the proposals in Julien Barnes-Dacey, A Framework for Euro-
pean-Russian Cooperation in Syria, Commentary (London: Euro-
pean Council of Foreign Relations [ECFR], 17 June 2019), 
https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_a_framework_for_ 
european_russian_cooperation_in_syria (accessed 6 March 
2020); Hinnebusch, “The Battle over Syria’s Reconstruction” 
(see note 6) and Muriel Asseburg and Alexander Aksenenok, 
Economic Reconstruction in Syria – An Area for EU-Russia Selective 
Engagement? EUREN Brief 16 (June 2020), http://www.eu-
russia-expertnetwork.eu/en/analytics/euren-brief-16 (accessed 
10 July 2020). 
tion should be dependent on concrete and verifiable 
political steps. 
First of all this would include elements relating to 
fundamental human rights. This would mean ceasing 
systematic abuses, arbitrary detention, torture and 
forced conscription by the Syrian security forces; 
political prisoners would have to be released, the fate 
of disappeared persons clarified, and refugees and 
IDPs able to return in dignity and safety; HLP rights 
would have to be guaranteed. For there to be any 
chance of success in this, impunity will have to be 
ended and rule of law strengthened.117 Further steps 
would then aim for a political opening and more 
inclusion (for example through elections under inter-
national supervision with the participation of all 
Syrians) and support the Geneva Process (Constitu-
tional Committee and reconciliation efforts). In return 
Europe could gradually resume technical cooperation 
with Syrian ministries, go beyond rehabilitation 
measures to devise and support plans for reconstruc-
tion, reforms and reconciliation jointly with state 
entities, local stakeholders and Syrian civil society,118 
and, at an appropriate point in time, appoint a high-
ranking EU envoy for reconstruction and relations 
with Damascus. 
No Blind Eye to Grave Human 
Rights Violations 
At the same time, normalisation of the relationship 
with top regime leaders should be excluded. There 
can be no return to “business as usual” with those 
who bear the main responsibility for grave human 
rights violations, war crimes and use of internationally 
banned weapons. Rather, Europe has a strong interest 
in ensuring that these actors are brought to justice. 
The stakes ultimately include securing a rules-based 
world order, deterring future potential perpetrators 
 
117 See the proposal for a European approach centred on 
rule of law in Bassma Kodmani, Europe Is the Key Player in Syria: 
An Alternative Template for Transition (Paris: Arab Reform Initia-
tive, 4 October 2018), https://www.arab-reform.net/publica 
tion/europe-is-the-key-player-in-syria-an-alternative-template-
for-transition/ (accessed 6 March 2020). 
118 SNHR, Joint Statement: A Vision from Syrian Civil Society 
Organizations about the General Principles of the Rebuilding Process 
of Syria, 5 December 2018, http://sn4hr.org/wp-content/pdf/ 
english/A_vision_from_Syrian_civil_society_organizations_ 
en.pdf (accessed 6 March 2020). 
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and achieving justice for the victims and/or their 
relatives. 
Europe should therefore continue to support the 
documentation of crimes by (Syrian) civil society or-
ganisations and international investigation mecha-
nisms like the IIIM.119 Neither the Syrian authorities 
nor the International Criminal Court can be expected 
to prosecute those accused of grave crimes. Syria is 
not a signatory of the latter, and Russia can be ex-
pected to veto any move in the UN Security Council 
to refer cases to the ICC. Therefore, Europe should 
instead encourage prosecutions in national courts 
under the principle of universal jurisdiction, wher-
ever possible, and ensure that their law enforcement 
agencies have the resources to do so.120 
 
119 The “International, Impartial and Independent Mecha-
nism to assist in the investigation and prosecution of persons 
responsible for the most serious crimes under International 
Law committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011” 
(IIIM) was established in December 2016 by the UN General 
Assembly (Resolution 71/248). Its mandate is to gather and 
analyse evidence and prepare documentation allowing pros-
ecution of violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law in Syria. 
120 Susanne Buckley-Zistel, “Gerechtigkeit für Syrien aus 
der Distanz? Das Weltrechtsprinzip und die strafrechtliche 
Aufarbeitung von Völkerrechtsverbrechen in Deutschland”, 
Zeitschrift für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (December 2019), 
n. p. 
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AFAD Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı 
(Disaster and Emergency Management 
Presidency, Turkey) 
AL Arab League 
BRI Belt and Road Initiative (China) 
COAR Center for Operational Analysis and Research 
(Beirut) 
EEAS European External Action Service 
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit 
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy 
EUI European University Institute (Florence) 
FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation of the 
United Nations 
FSA Free Syrian Army (opposition rebel formation) 
GIZ Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
(German development agency) 
HDI Human Development Index  
HLP Housing, land and property rights 
HTS Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (Organization for the 
Liberation of the Levant; dominant rebel for-
mation in Idlib province, emerged from the 
Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda) 
ICC International Criminal Court 
ICG International Crisis Group 
IDP Internally displaced person 
IED Improvised explosive device 
IIIM International, Impartial and Independent 
Mechanism to assist in the investigation and 
prosecution of persons responsible for the most 
serious crimes under International Law com-
mitted in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 
2011 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation 
IOM International Organisation for Migration 
IS “Islamic State” 
KNC Kurdish National Council 
OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons 
PYD Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (Democratic Union 
Party; Syrian sister party of PKK) 
SANA Syrian Arab News Agency 
SARC Syrian Arab Red Crescent 
SDF Syrian Democratic Forces (militias of the 
Kurdish-dominated self-administration in 
north-eastern Syria) 
SIG Syrian Interim Government (opposition 
government, based in Gaziantep, Turkey) 
SNA Syrian National Army (emerged from FSA, allied 
with Turkey) 
SNHR Syrian Network for Human Rights (opposition) 
SOHR Syrian Observatory for Human Rights 
(opposition) 
UAE United Arab Emirates 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation 
UNESCWA United Nations Economic and Social Commis-
sion for Western Asia 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Emer-
gency Fund 
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service 
UN OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs 
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
WFP World Food Programme 
YPG Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People’s Protection 
Units; PYD militias and dominant formation 
within SDF) 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
